Re: Three steps we could take to make supply chain attacks a bit harder

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Gary Buhrmaster wrote:
> [2] As I understand it, the issue is the
> lack of the required trusted environment
> in generic Linux.  There are software
> implementations that do not have the
> hardware enclave protections,

And to be honest, I do not see the problem there. I will use whatever will 
let me pass the Fedora security theater checks without investing in extra 
hardware. (This also means that if I am offered the choice, I will pick TOTP 
over FIDO2 any day, because TOTP does not require me to emulate a fake 
hardware crypto device like FIDO2 does.)

And in my view, the fact that, in those implementations, there is no 
Treacherous Computing hardware preventing me from doing what I want with my 
own private key (e.g., just copying the same key to all my devices, as I can 
also do with TOTP) is actually a feature, even if it goes against the 
"security" model.

        Kevin Kofler
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