* Kevin P. Fleming: > In a similar (parallel) discussion related to future RHEL, it has been > found this change also breaks resolution of many DNSSEC-secured > domains which are still using SHA1 signatures. It is impossible to > know how long it will be before those domains upgrade to better > signatures, and at the moment it's rather challenging for resolvers to > be able to determine that the resolution failure was caused by local > policy instead of an actual invalid signature. At least that's a solvable problem: perform DNSSEC validation (to prevent actual attacks) and pretend to clients that you didn't do it (to avoid relying on signatures which aren't policy-confiorming). DNSSEC supports that approach quite well for ordinary record types. It's different from the web, where https:// and http:// are not equivalent in practice for many domains, and the schema is also visible to Javascript. Thanks, Florian _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
