Re: Preventing account takeovers through expired domains

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On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 11:33:55AM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 20, 2022 at 04:08:43PM -0800, Adam Williamson wrote:
> > On Sun, 2022-02-20 at 16:42 +0000, Gary Buhrmaster wrote:
> > > Unfortunately, last I checked, the FAS account
> > > system did not support adding something
> > > like a FIDO2 security key to an account(**).
> > > Even if it did, I suspect not all the other parts
> > > of the system would support FIDO keys.
> > 
> > It used to support these, but the support was lost with the recent
> > rewrite. However, it supports Google Authenticator-style OTPs. Folks
> > with infra privileges on their accounts (like me) are already required
> > to use these. It works fine. I preferred being able to use a yubikey so
> > I don't always have to open an app on my phone and retype a six digit
> > code when I need to log in to something, but that's just a minor
> > annoyance.
> 
> Given that the accounts system already supports these OTPs, what
> is the reason for not mandating this OTP based 2FA for *all*
> contributors today, as oppposed to merely infra people ?

All contributors? ie, require an otp to make an account?
Or did you mean all packagers? or something else?

I don't think there's any way in IPA to require otp as a requirement for
group membership currently. (Please let me know if there is). 
Which would leave us checking after the fact and removing people without
one set, which is a big pile of hassle. :( 
 
> We know that Fedora contributors have had their passwords compromised
> in the past [1], so not using 2FA of any kind is a risk to Fedora.
> 
> I understand these simple OTPs are not as secure as FIDO2, but
> they have the clear advantage of actually being supported in
> Fedora's auth system today. These OTPs are good enough that 1000's
> of companies globally use them, rather than relying on plain passwords
> only.
> 
> By all means have FIDO2 supported as the desired long term goal, but
> it feels dubious to stick with only plain passwords in the meantime.
> FIDO2 support requires significant dev work on a service that is not
> under Fedora's control and make take many many years to arrive in a
> form that is usable.

Enforcing otp per group also would require dev work from what I
understand. :(

kevin

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