On Wed, Dec 29, 2021 at 6:06 AM Nico Kadel-Garcia <nkadel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 29, 2021 at 5:42 AM Roberto Sassu via devel > <devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > From: Nico Kadel-Garcia [mailto:nkadel@xxxxxxxxx] > > > Sent: Wednesday, December 29, 2021 10:29 AM > > > > [...] > > > > > From one of the patches: > > > > > > It accomplishes this task by storing reference values coming from > > > software vendors and by reporting whether or not the > > > digest of file content or metadata calculated by IMA (or EVM) is found > > > among those values. > > > > > > That has no use but digital rights management. > > > > Hi Nico > > > > I give some clarifications. > > You've been very clear. To wit: > > > This applies if you want to enforce an IMA appraisal policy, > > which denies access to the files if file verification fails. I > > That is also spelled "DRM", The idea that only code approved by a > third party is permitted access to specific files violates the core > principles of "free software". Putting the code in the kernel makes it > more awkward for ordinary users to access the data and software on > their own computers. > > > This will be possible because you will have the ability to load > > your own GPG (or RSA) keys to the kernel to verify data source > > authenticity of the digest lists. > > There is no need to do this in the kernel. It can happen in userland. > > > This applies if you want to enforce an IMA appraisal policy, > > which denies access to the files if file verification fails. If you > > Replace the word "IMA" with DRM everywhere to understand the end goal > of such features. I'm sorry if I seem a bit vehement about this. We > saw this attempted with Palladium or "Trusted Computing" for boot > loaders, and it wasted a lot of time for features that were defeated > pretty easily in the end by virtualization. Were they really? TPM devices *are* commonly used today to support attestation and multi-factor encryption and authentication mechanisms. In many ways, the trusted computing initiative was a success. And even virtualization is used for implementing trusted computing in some platforms. With Windows 11, they're *mandatory*. Corporate policies now effectively *require* TPM-based mechanisms *in addition* to classical password or token-based multi-factor authentication. The difference between IMA/verity and DRM is that the former is under the system owner's control (in this case, *you*), and the latter is *not*. While Palladium as a whole hasn't *yet* made it, huge chunks of it has. Verified and measured boot mechanisms exist in Windows and macOS, remote and local attestation for integrity exist for Windows, and so on. Some of these features exist in Linux, but not all just yet. There is a ton of value in user-controlled versions of this capability. And again, none of this is on by default, it's up to *you* to turn it on. -- 真実はいつも一つ！/ Always, there's only one truth! _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
