* Frank Ch. Eigler: > Unfortunately, in the absence of per-file signatures generated by the > build system, and securely distributed out-of-band, I can't think of any > way to provide client-side verifiability of a debuginfod type service. > That's independent of any particular level of server code robustness. I hat to bring them up, but IMA signatures could *almost* be used for this. They cover individual files. The problem is that any Fedora developer can get an IMA signature of any file contents. There is nothing in the signature that says that it's been produced by debuginfo generation. So I'm not sure if IMA signatures actually reduce the attack surface in any significant way. Thanks, Florian _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
