> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DebuginfodByDefault The change page lacks a discussion of security implications. An informed decision requires answers to questions such as: · What kinds of attacks might be possible with malicious debuginfo files? (For example debugging tools might have undiscovered bugs that could be exploited by malformed DWARF data.) · How is it verified that files received from debuginfo servers have not been tampered with? · Is there any end-to-end authentication from the Fedora build system to my workstation – which there is with signed debuginfo packages – or do the tools blindly trust a whole network of federated debuginfo servers? > Some Debian users have > [https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2021/02/msg00262.html expressed > concerns] that this facility "calls home" during debugging, so it may > expose a limited amount of information about what a user is debugging. To fully understand the privacy implications, one needs to know: · Does that happen every time, or are downloaded files cached locally? · If there is a cache, when are old files purged from the cache? The change page should also mention how a network problem can impact the usability of debugging tools. Could it for example make GDB hang for a minute every time it encounters a new source filename? Finally, if somebody doesn't like the answers to the above questions, then they'll want to know how to disable the feature. Björn Persson
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