Re: F35 Change: Debuginfod By Default (Self-Contained Change proposal)

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Frank Ch. Eigler wrote:
> Björn Persson writes:
> 
> > · How is it verified that files received from debuginfo servers have not
> >   been tampered with?  
> 
> Following up further to this, we're planning to add optional client-side
> hash-verification of cached content, to provide some protection against
> tampering:
> 
> https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=27758

The design you propose there won't improve anything for anyone. If the
hash is computed on the debuginfo server, then an attacker who can make
the server serve malicious debuginfo can also make it serve hashes that
match the malicious files. And as you noted yourself, an attacker who
can manipulate cached files client-side has already taken over the user
account anyway.

Quote from Sourceware Bugzilla:
> As transport over HTTPS protects the content, we can safely assume
> that immediately during/after the download, the content will be fine.
> However, what of cached files?

Of course – from your point of view. From my point of view, I can safely
assume that nobody has tampered with my cache. However, what of files on
the debuginfo server?

I see that debuginfod.fedoraproject.org is currently another name for
koji.fedoraproject.org. Given that it serves debuginfo only for Fedora
packages, and does not forward requests to any other debuginfo servers,
using this server seems equivalent security-wise to downloading unsigned
packages from Koji.

As far as I understand, packages are built and signed on separate
servers with a smaller attack surface than the web front-end to minimize
the risk that an attacker could tamper with them. To make the debuginfo
protocol as secure as signed debuginfo packages, the client should
verify the files against a hash computed and signed on the signing
server.

Perhaps a hash of the debuginfo could be stored in a signed RPM package,
either the main package or a separate debughash package?

For those who are concerned about privacy, the proposal would make that
problem worse as it would cause the "phoning home" to happen every time
they debug something.

By the way, the change page still doesn't say enough about how network
problems will affect the user experience. Making a previously offline
activity network-dependent also makes it sensitive to network problems.
For example, if great packet loss causes TCP timeouts or long delays,
will that make GDB hang for minutes at a time, or is it handled
asynchronously? Will GDB hang once per process, once per login session,
or every time it encounters a new source filename?

Björn Persson

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