* Kevin Kofler via devel:
> But the thing is, fstatat is not really a newer version of fstat, it
> unfortunately has very different security properties. fstat allows
> retrieving the stat metadata only of already open files (if you know or
> guess the fd). On the other hand, fstatat allows retrieving the stat
> metadata of ANY file on the file system. It even accepts an absolute path as
> the relative pathspec, in which case the fd is ignored entirely. (And I
> guess it also allows directory traversal using "..", but that does not
> matter anyway since it also accepts absolute paths to begin with.) And the
> only way to distinguish the fstat case ("" pathspec) from the stat case
> (absolute pathspec) is to actually look at the string, which cannot be done
> in BPF.
This is currently not a major consideration for system call design. We
can't add this downstream from the kernel if support just isn't there.
You have to solve these issues for porting to other architectures
anyway.
Thanks,
Florian
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