Re: Fedora 32 System-Wide Change proposal: Disallow Empty Password By Default

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 12/6/19 7:19 PM, Kevin Kofler wrote:
Lennart Poettering wrote:
If you know where stuff is located you can change individual blocks in
files. You are not going to know what you are changing them to, but
you can change it and traditional files will not detect that you did that.
Then you get unpredictable garbage as the result, which is useless if your
goal (as the attacker) is to plant a trojan horse that steals encrypted data
while it is decrypted. (And of course, you cannot directly decrypt the data
either.) The only way to exfiltrate the data is to attack the system while
it is running (online).
It's like fuzzing: injecting garbage results in unintended code paths being taken, which is a stepping stone to gaining execution control. Of course this happens when the system is started up, so it is a multi-step process, but if you include that in your threat model you have to worry about it.
_______________________________________________
devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/
List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[Index of Archives]     [Fedora Announce]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Kernel]     [Fedora Testing]     [Fedora Formulas]     [Fedora PHP Devel]     [Kernel Development]     [Fedora Legacy]     [Fedora Maintainers]     [Fedora Desktop]     [PAM]     [Red Hat Development]     [Gimp]     [Yosemite News]

  Powered by Linux