On Mon, 2005-01-24 at 09:16 -0500, Jeff Johnson wrote: > A busted mirror or a missing dependency will stop a seurity update far > more effectively > than "missingok", don't fool yerself. Certainly. But could missingok ever ever ever stop a security update? Of course not, so long as packagers or package manager authors don't do anything stupid. :-D I think what bothers me about this is that I'm having trouble identifying what I trust in the before missingok scenario vs. what I mistrust in the after scenario. I think it's that the correct use of the feature is distributed so widely that it would be hard for me to reestablish trust in the new regime. My guess is that you are right about this. It's just that there's a lot more to it than meets the eye. I have a little trouble getting my head around all of it. I have to be cautious because I have customers who want their precious, (pant pant) PRECIOUS security updates. -- Darrin
