> OK, so what are the risks under Wayland? > ... > > Since the security is improved under Wayland, are non-elevated applications > still able to eavesdrop or falsify input/output of elevated applications? > The opposite direction is not that important, I think, because if you run > something as root (regardless of CLI or GUI), you explicitly trust it to do > almost anything to your system. If you decide to trust gedit or meld, I > don't see the difference from trusting vim or emacs. Unless there's > something in Wayland that is similar to vulnerabilities in X11? > > Thanks for explanation. Either I missed it, or nobody replied to my question. I'd be really interested to read the answer, if somebody knows it, thanks. I'm not saying we should not minimize the number of operations that we need to perform as root. Sure we should. But there will always be some root-only ones. In the old days, we said "X11 is not safe, that's why you should use CLI tools as root, GUI tools are not recommended". And now that we can possibly have secure windowing system, we say "GUI tools as root can't be used at all". Which is the opposite answer than I expected from the Wayland hype, I imagined "both CLI and GUI are safe now, use whatever you like". So, what are the attack vectors under Wayland that CLI apps don't have? -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.fedoraproject.org/admin/lists/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
