On Monday, July 20, 2015 12:45:28 PM Andrew Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Monday, July 20, 2015 11:09:39 AM Andrew Lutomirski wrote: > >> On Jul 20, 2015 11:05 AM, "Florian Weimer" <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> > On 07/20/2015 05:59 PM, Steve Grubb wrote: > >> > > Today, any application that wants to manipulate capabilities needs to > >> > > be > >> > > capability aware. > >> > > >> > The application does not want to manipulate capabilities. I do not > >> > want > >> > to run it as full root. I don't want to add additional SUID/fscaps to > >> > the file system. > >> > > >> > It's somewhat silly to add a privilege escalation hatch to the file > >> > system in order to run a daemon with *reduced* privileges. > >> > >> This is exactly why the ambient caps patch is sitting in -mm. If you > >> want > >> to read it and email a quick review, that might help it along. :) > > > > The real problem with capabilities is there is no way to say, I trust this > > child process with this capability, but don't let it get inherited beyond > > this process that I'm about to start. > > Why would you want to do that? Because you know exactly why the program needs a capability and its not known to have children. Therefore any children must be because of an exploit. The way it is, capabilities are inherited and you can't stop it. -Steve -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
