Chris Adams writes:
Once upon a time, Sam Varshavchik <mrsam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> said: > Chris Adams writes: > >Once upon a time, Sam Varshavchik <mrsam@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> said: > >> Chris Adams writes: > >> >Is there any value in this "additional check" (that nobody else > >> >apparently does)? Do you not trust the kernel's credential handling? > >> > >> I certainly trust it. But just because I trust it, it doesn't mean that > >any > >> additional checks have no value. > > > >Sure it does. If the credentials are always correct, additional checks > >past that are a waste of cycles. > > You feel absolutely confident that just because you can't think of any > value of additional checks, there cannot possibly be any. > > You're wrong. Prove it.
Why? I am not trying to prove this. I am trying to prove that prelink is broken. The two are not the same.
Whether it does work, or does not work, that can stand on its own merits, and has no relevance on the merits of prelink's behavior of rewriting executables, without any means available of reliably remediating that, short of recording the same hack for every application that /etc/cron.daily/prelink does for /sbin/telinit.
If what prelink is doing is perfectly fine, then there's no reason to have the /sbin/telinit hack in /etc/cron.daily, is it? That statement, of course, would be either true or false irrespective of what I'm doing, which is completely irrelevant.
But, of course, nobody is willing to address that point.
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