I just read through the MS docs on SecureBoot and this is the biggest Rube-Goldberg machine. I could not think of a nastier solution to a problem than what they've dreamt up here. The whole problem they are trying to solve is that of booting only known-good code. That would be much easier accomplished by having the OS reside on a read-only device that could only be written to by the user actively using hardware to enable the write during installation. That would create a system where there was no possible programmatic means of corrupting the OS during normal operation. No signatures, no crypto-databases, or other SecureBoot gobbledy-gook needed. To implement this would require only that new systems support two drives, one with controllable-by-user read-write-controller interface for storing the OS. Forensic firms have been using these types of read-write controllable drive interfaces for years. Hardware already exists. . -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
