Re: Proposal: Fedora Workstation ships with enabled trusted flatpak runtime remotes

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> > Can you elaborate? What security issues?
> > Could installing runtime X subvert runtime Y used by other apps, e.g.
> > by claiming that X is an update for Y? In that case I'd expect that
> > GPG keys have to match, or something like that.
> 
> Yeah, the app requires the runtime X which is not installed and adds a
> remote to install it, but the remote could also contain a malicious
> version of the runtime Y which is already installed and used by other
> apps, and the malicious version overrides it as an update. Then other
> apps get infected.
> I think all that matters are runtime ID and version, AFAIK GPG only
> checks if the runtime comes from the remote it claims it does.
> Yes, there could be a safety catch that would prevent updating the
> runtime from a different remote than the original one.

I think this is quite essential to have. It would allow automatic runtime installation without any questions asked, which is something I expected (or at least hoped for) from flatpack. I want to download a file and double click on it. I don't want to decide whether remote X needed for runtime Y is trustworthy or not. The user should not even know what a runtime is, it should be completely transparent :)

I'm no security expert but in my naive world it shouldn't be too hard to make sure that remotes can't supply updates for runtimes from other remotes, using digital signatures.
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