Re: 'discard' as default

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On 2 Jan 2019 21:41 +0100, from calestyo@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Christoph Anton Mitterer):
>> To our knowledge, that's only a problem if you need plausible
>> deniability, wich LUKS doesn't provide anyway.
> 
> AFAIK, this hasn't to do anything with plausible deniability (at least
> not in the classic sense of "hidden encryption"), but rather that an
> attacker might gain valuable information that can be used for further
> attacks... and as always it's likely just our imagination which limits
> these.
> 
> One could think of deletion patterns that (depending on their size)
> give hint what is being deleted (what you might have meant by plausible
> deniability?)... or perhaps it could eventually somehow help in
> statistical attacks (maybe a regularly deleted file with more or less
> known content)?

Pattern analysis (which is made far easier by TRIM pass-through) can
certainly tell an attacker which file system is likely in use on the
device, and give them an idea of how much data is likely there. I
don't remember where I saw it, but I did see a write-up by someone who
had created various major Linux file systems on otherwise blank
devices. The differences in data layout were _clearly_ visible.

With payload data added, the differences might be less obvious, but
they are still going to be there. A partition with a XFS file system
is going to look different from one with ext4, or ZFS, or something
else, even if the attacker can't tell _what's_ stored there.

The point of filling the partition with random data is to make this
kind of attack much harder to pull off.

Sure; which file system is in use might be basically public knowledge
anyway, and it _shouldn't_ give an attacker an advantage. But it's
information that the attacker doesn't _necessarily_ need to have, and
certainly information they don't need be fed on a silver platter (or
chip, as the case may be).

Good cryptography design aims to give an attacker as little
information as possible about the underlying plaintext. Deviating from
that goal as a default should require an _awfully_ good reason.

-- 
Michael Kjörling • https://michael.kjorling.se • michael@xxxxxxxxxxx
  “The most dangerous thought that you can have as a creative person
              is to think you know what you’re doing.” (Bret Victor)
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