Re: LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot bit errors

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On 04/25/2017 06:16 PM, Sven Eschenberg wrote:
> 
> Furthermore, everyone who had access to /dev/mem and was able to locate 
> the keys knows, them. On second thought, this holds certainly true for 
> the 'new central kernel key storage' (Forgot the name), depending on the 
> allover kernel configuration and userspace, that is.
> 
> At the end of the day dm-crypt (etc.) needs to store the key somewhere, 
> where it can be accessed at all times when an IO-Request comes in. There 
> is not that many options for that ;-).

Crypto API stores the key in memory as well (even the round keys etc), obviously.

We have already support for kernel keyring in dm-crypt (so the key will
not be directly visible in dmsetup table), this will be supported in next major
version of cryptsetup/LUKS.

But as you said, if you have access to the kernel memory, it is there anyway...

Milan
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