Re: LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot bit errors

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On 04/24/2017 06:49 PM, protagonist wrote:
However, I assume it is likely that a determined attacker running as
root might be able to extract the master key from RAM if the encrypted
volume in question is still open at the time of attack, so technically,
there would be a way to do this without the password.

It's trivial. Just run "dmsetup table --showkeys" on the device.

--
Bob Nichols     "NOSPAM" is really part of my email address.
                Do NOT delete it.

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