Am 16.01.2014 21:18, schrieb Matthias Schniedermeyer: > On 16.01.2014 20:33, Milan Broz wrote: >> >> But I cannot say that all possible situations comes under this qualification. >> Maybe it can help someone in dangerous situation to not leak some important data >> which later help others. Dunno. >> >> Still it doesn't mean it is worth to be implemented but let's think >> at least twice here please. > > Meanwhile increasing the risk of everybody else, because once that > feature is a documented part of the system everybody will assume that > everybody will use it. Good look defending against a "Destruction of > Evidence" accusation, in case that happens in a situation with a LEO. > > Same as the hidden volume "feature" of Truecypt which everybody will > assume you use, because it's such a swell feature. (Plausible > deniabilty? Yeah sure <snort>) > > > In short: > The documented existence of such a feature is a risk by itself. Same logic applied, even the existence of this discussion is a risk by itself. It proves that people might use a patched cryptsetup with added nuke feature already. Kind regards, jonas _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
