On Sun, 2010-06-27 at 04:53 +0200, Arno Wagner wrote: > For running, I recomend looking up physical memory freezing. > It allows you to cool down the memory, pull the pwer plug and > read the complete memeory contents up to a few minutes later on > an external device. The keys are in there. Yeah of course,.. I know... People have to keep this in mind when that want that level of security, and never leave their PCs alone too long when they're on (or suspended to RAM). I for example, always power it off, when I leave my faculty office for longer time (e.g. during lunch)... (all my colleagues are evil ;) *G* ) > For not running, there are numerous ways to still attack the system. Including, "inviting" me to Guantanmo an beat me so long until I give them the passphrases with pleasure ;) Seriously,... of course there are still ways (which do you think of?)... but this should not mean, that we do not harden everything as much as we can.. > The current consensus in much of the security community is that > if an attacker has that level of physical access, you are screwed > anyways. Uhm.... must secure my office with some anti-person-mines ;) > Your kernel, for example, cannot be encrypted. But I can take that one always with me. > Keyloggers in all sizes and shapes, including inside your keyboard > can be installed. Other things can be done. Of course,... and mighty attackers could replace your CPU with one that looks like normal, but that hast a "root-kid" and sends everything via radio signals... But again my argument,... we could then drop most of our security efforts, as there are always much weaker parts in the chain. Cheers, Chris. _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
