> > Can an attacker discern the size of individual files if the device has not
> > been overwritten first?
>
> It´s a practical approach to give you a better understanding. Try less -f
> /dev/sdX on the device you are going to encrypt. A blank block device is filled
> with zeros or continually the same single character. Issuing shred /dev/sdX
> shows strong resemblance to what loop-aes encryption leaves behind.
> In case only a first fraction of a block device is filled with such random
> (looking) data one might suggest you to reveal keys/passes to uncover the real
> nature of this information. In case you find a method of storing data using just
> one character please inform me as soon as possible ;-)
Ok so you're saying it is about plausible deniability concerning the likelihood of there being encrypted data there, not about trying to uncover anything actually usable about the encrypted plaintext.
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Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system
Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
