Florian Reitmeir <fr@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: [...] > Much more interessting would it be to work on support for PKCS#11 USB > tokens > to get rid of the user-password. Only a minority boot from an crypto disk, > so a > trojan or "other" software can easily sniff your password (with X11 this > is > really very simple). > > > So my initial assumption was probably correct - it's the extraneous > factors (fstab, having encryption software, etc) that probably remain the > practical indicators. Sorry, you seem to have missed last part of loop-aes readme, don´t you? I remember some notes on how to boot from a single USB Memory Stick. So indeed, there remains no "crypto" on the disk. I am sorry that the instructions on how to remove unwanted partition table / boot sector are not included in the readme now. The main problem is, that there might remain clear data on a disk. I don´t think you can distingush between a "shred /dev/hda"-disc and an encrypted one I have dealt with. Regards, Peter -- "Feel free" – 10 GB Mailbox, 100 FreeSMS/Monat ... Jetzt GMX TopMail testen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/topmail - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
