Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] netkit: use netlink policy for mode and policy attributes validation

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On 10/26/23 17:11, Ido Schimmel wrote:
On Thu, Oct 26, 2023 at 12:41:06PM +0300, Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
  static const struct nla_policy netkit_policy[IFLA_NETKIT_MAX + 1] = {
  	[IFLA_NETKIT_PEER_INFO]		= { .len = sizeof(struct ifinfomsg) },
-	[IFLA_NETKIT_POLICY]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
-	[IFLA_NETKIT_MODE]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
-	[IFLA_NETKIT_PEER_POLICY]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[IFLA_NETKIT_POLICY]		= NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN(NLA_U32,
+								 netkit_check_policy),

Nik, it's problematic to use NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN() with anything
other than NLA_BINARY. See commit 9e17f99220d1 ("net/sched: act_mpls:
Fix warning during failed attribute validation").


But how is that code called at all? The validation type is NLA_VALIDATE_FUNCTION(), not NLA_VALIDATE_MIN/MAX/RANGE/RANGE_WARN...
nla_validate_int_range() is called only on:
        case NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_PTR:
        case NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE:
        case NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_WARN_TOO_LONG:
        case NLA_VALIDATE_MIN:
        case NLA_VALIDATE_MAX:

Anyway, I'll switch to NLA_BINARY in a bit to make sure it's ok. Thanks for the pointer.

+	[IFLA_NETKIT_MODE]		= NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN(NLA_U32,
+								 netkit_check_mode),
+	[IFLA_NETKIT_PEER_POLICY]	= NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN(NLA_U32,
+								 netkit_check_policy),
  	[IFLA_NETKIT_PRIMARY]		= { .type = NLA_REJECT,
  					    .reject_message = "Primary attribute is read-only" },
  };
--
2.38.1







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