Not mentioned in this article is that Mineta should go - he is grossly incompentent! You have been sent this message from David Ross (damiross@attbi.com) as a courtesy of WorldNetDaily.com (http://www.worldnetdaily.com). Friday, April 26, 2002 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Agents to Mineta: Rethink airport-security plan By Paul Sperry ------------------------------------------------------------------ Posted: April 26, 2002 1:18 a.m. Eastern WASHINGTON - Move over bureaucrats, politicians and "bodyguards," you don't know what you're doing. That's the consensus of active and former federal airport-security agents and inspectors regarding Transportation Department Secretary Norman Mineta and his new aviation-security chief, John Magaw, a Secret Service veteran. They say the officials' strategy so far to tighten security at airports after the Sept. 11 hijackings is fundamentally flawed, in large part because they have little or no hands-on experience in aviation security. And they refuse to consult with people in the field who do, the agents complain. "We were never asked to get involved in solutions," said Bogdan Dzakovic, a senior airport-security inspector at the Transportation Security Administration here. They're not the only ones critical of the way officials are handling security upgrades at the airports. Powerful members of Congress have recently ripped Mineta for a number of missteps, including picking what appears to have been the wrong equipment to meet a year-end deadline to screen all checked luggage. Mineta initially ordered hundreds of truck-size scanning machines costing more than a million dollars each. But Congress learned from experts and the press that, not only will it take too long to build the 2,000-plus machines needed for all 429 airports, but they don't even really work. The scanners check for density, not chemicals, and often mistake cheese, chocolate, soap and even toys for exposives. False alarms recently triggered costly evacuations at major California airports. "They can't tell the difference between a bomb and a bowel movement," said former Federal Aviation Administration special agent Steve Elson. They also weigh several tons, meaning airports would have to reinforce flooring, as well as reconstruct their baggage-loading systems to accommodate the ponderous machines. The plan had all the earmarks of a multi-billion-dollar boondoggle, and now it appears Mineta is at least throttling back from it. This week he cut projected orders for the giant scanners in half and is leaning toward smaller bomb-sniffing equipment and dogs to help meet the deadline. But field agents have been aware of problems with the scanners for years. And they say they could have saved Mineta a lot of headache and time - had he asked them for their advice. Agents aren't too impressed with Magaw, either, who has filled the management ranks of TSA with a lot of old FAA managers and fellow Secret Service vets. "We still have the same circle of managers that were responsible for the deplorable (security) conditions leading up to Sept. 11," said Dzakovic, leader of the elite Red Team that covertly tests airport checkpoints. "They are now the main advisers to TSA." Brian F. Sullivan, retired FAA special agent, points out that none of the "chief architects of insecurity" at Logan International Airport in Boston - site of two of the hijackings - have been fired. Some, such as Willie Gripper and Mary Carol Turano of the administration's New England Region, have even been promoted, he says. "Instead of being held accountable," he said, "both have been rewarded." Agents add that, while Secret Service agents make good "bodyguards," they are out of their element when it comes to protecting airports and airplanes. Yet Magaw has put them in key positions, including one who, by all accounts, had a dismal security record at his last government job. Agents say that their new boss seems more concerned with customer service than security. It was Magaw's idea to add chairs and shoehorns at checkpoints for passengers randomly picked by screeners to remove their shoes for inspection, they point out. He also took a special interest in the design of new uniforms for the 30,000 new federal screeners. TSA had no comment. But enough griping. What would agents do if they were in Magaw's shoes? Here is their plan: 1. Closely supervise checkpoint screeners. Adopt the successful McDonald's model, Dzakovic says, of setting clear, simple rules and deadlines, and supervising workers minute-by-minute to make sure they're carried out. He suggests TSA hire retired Marine or police sergeants to shadow screeners from start to end of shifts. Elson agrees, adding that metal detectors recently went unplugged for so long at Logan and other airports not because of the plugs, but because of a lack of supervision. He explains that a little red light blinks every time a passenger walks through the magnetometer portal, and if supervisors were on the ball, they would have noticed the red light stop blinking. And they would have known right away that the power was off. Short of that, end-of-shift testing of the detectors with metal objects would have alerted them to the problem - if screeners were properly supervised to do that, he says. "No one is giving the screeners close guidance," said Elson, who talks to airport-security personnel every day. "They are pretty much left to their own devices." Sullivan concurred. "Supervision of the checkpoints was supposed to be enhanced with the TSA takeover, but it's not happening - as evidenced by sleeping screeners, unplugged metal detectors and other such incidents since the TSA took over Feb. 17," he said. 2. Aggressively test checkpoints using real weapons. Dzakovic says dummy guns and bombs used by undercover agents are too easy for screeners to spot and don't represent the level of sophistication of today's terrorists. He'd also like to see more testing done. Since Sept. 11, the Red Team hasn't done any tests, he says. "Apparently the Red Team is in the process of being dissolved - a team that proved that security failed for years," he said, suggesting that TSA is no more interested in hearing about security problems than FAA. Asked if the Red Team's been grounded, TSA spokesman Paul Turk said: "If that's true, I haven't heard it." 3. Secure the back side of airports. Agents say that while everyone is focused on the checkpoints, access to planes from the gates and tarmac is still relatively easy. "Someone could just go and throw a bomb in an aircraft baggage hold," Elson said. Vehicles on the ramp aren't properly marked, ramp workers aren't always displaying their ID badges and security seldom checks badges, Elson says. Pilots agree that unrestricted access to the back-end of planes is the weakest security link. 4. Post National Guardsmen on the ramps. Agents say the most effective role for them is guarding planes, particularly at night. Posting them inside terminals is just "eye wash" for worried passengers, agents argue. Many of them don't even keep their M-16s loaded. "They're just standing there like trees," Dzakovic said. "They should be doing night-time patrols of the tarmac." "They're best used for perimeter security," Sullivan agreed. 5. Inspect planes before the day's first takeoffs. "Security should be checking planes in the morning, before the first flight," Dzakovic said. "Right now flight attendants sweep them." Cleaning crews are the last ones on the planes at night, he says, and such service workers still aren't vetted by security. 6. Sniff all cargo and mail for bombs. They go in the belly of planes along with luggage, yet they're only randomly scanned for bombs. Regular cargo isn't inspected at all. What's the point of inspecting all checked luggage for explosives if parcels aren't also inspected? agents wonder. 7. Conduct human profiling of passengers. "That's the single-biggest deterrent to terrorism," Dzakovic said. "Yet we don't do it because we're still so damned PC (politically correct)." He says large groups of young Arab men should be split up and forced to fly on separate flights. Sullivan agrees: "There's too much emphasis on stopping bad things, as opposed to stopping bad people, from getting on planes." He suggests TSA deploy security teams at airports to stop and question, or at least strike up conversations with, passengers acting suspiciously or fitting the terrorist profile. 8. Arm pilots. Most agents agree pilots need to be allowed to carry guns in the cockpit as a last line of defense against hijackers. Some 78 percent of American Airline pilots want to be armed, according to a recent poll by their union. Paul Sperry is Washington bureau chief for WorldNetDaily. ------------------------------------------------------------------