Great post...I agree with most of the issues addressed in this article. ...and yes, Mineta is just a show figure. Walter DCA ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Ross" <damiross@attbi.com> To: <AIRLINE@LISTSERV.CUNY.EDU> Sent: Friday, April 26, 2002 11:33 Subject: Agents to Mineta: Rethink airport-security plan > Not mentioned in this article is that Mineta should go - he is grossly > incompentent! > > > You have been sent this message from David Ross > (damiross@attbi.com) as a courtesy of WorldNetDaily.com > (http://www.worldnetdaily.com). > > Friday, April 26, 2002 > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Agents to Mineta: Rethink airport-security plan > By Paul Sperry > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Posted: April 26, 2002 > 1:18 a.m. Eastern > > WASHINGTON - Move over bureaucrats, politicians and "bodyguards," you don't > know what you're doing. > > That's the consensus of active and former federal airport-security agents > and inspectors regarding Transportation Department Secretary Norman Mineta > and his new aviation-security chief, John Magaw, a Secret Service veteran. > > They say the officials' strategy so far to tighten security at airports > after the Sept. 11 hijackings is fundamentally flawed, in large part because > they have little or no hands-on experience in aviation security. And they > refuse to consult with people in the field who do, the agents complain. > > "We were never asked to get involved in solutions," said Bogdan Dzakovic, a > senior airport-security inspector at the Transportation Security > Administration here. > > They're not the only ones critical of the way officials are handling > security upgrades at the airports. > > Powerful members of Congress have recently ripped Mineta for a number of > missteps, including picking what appears to have been the wrong equipment to > meet a year-end deadline to screen all checked luggage. > > Mineta initially ordered hundreds of truck-size scanning machines costing > more than a million dollars each. > > But Congress learned from experts and the press that, not only will it take > too long to build the 2,000-plus machines needed for all 429 airports, but > they don't even really work. > > The scanners check for density, not chemicals, and often mistake cheese, > chocolate, soap and even toys for exposives. False alarms recently triggered > costly evacuations at major California airports. > > "They can't tell the difference between a bomb and a bowel movement," said > former Federal Aviation Administration special agent Steve Elson. > > They also weigh several tons, meaning airports would have to reinforce > flooring, as well as reconstruct their baggage-loading systems to > accommodate the ponderous machines. > > The plan had all the earmarks of a multi-billion-dollar boondoggle, and now > it appears Mineta is at least throttling back from it. This week he cut > projected orders for the giant scanners in half and is leaning toward > smaller bomb-sniffing equipment and dogs to help meet the deadline. > > But field agents have been aware of problems with the scanners for years. > And they say they could have saved Mineta a lot of headache and time - had > he asked them for their advice. > > Agents aren't too impressed with Magaw, either, who has filled the > management ranks of TSA with a lot of old FAA managers and fellow Secret > Service vets. > > "We still have the same circle of managers that were responsible for the > deplorable (security) conditions leading up to Sept. 11," said Dzakovic, > leader of the elite Red Team that covertly tests airport checkpoints. "They > are now the main advisers to TSA." > > Brian F. Sullivan, retired FAA special agent, points out that none of the > "chief architects of insecurity" at Logan International Airport in Boston - > site of two of the hijackings - have been fired. Some, such as Willie > Gripper and Mary Carol Turano of the administration's New > England Region, have even been promoted, he says. > > "Instead of being held accountable," he said, "both have been rewarded." > > Agents add that, while Secret Service agents make good "bodyguards," they > are out of their element when it comes to protecting airports and airplanes. > > Yet Magaw has put them in key positions, including one who, by all accounts, > had a dismal security record at his last government job. > Agents say that their new boss seems more concerned with customer service > than security. > > It was Magaw's idea to add chairs and shoehorns at checkpoints for > passengers randomly picked by screeners to remove their shoes for > inspection, they point out. He also took a special interest in the design of > new uniforms for the 30,000 new federal screeners. > TSA had no comment. > > But enough griping. What would agents do if they were in Magaw's shoes? > > Here is their plan: > 1. Closely supervise checkpoint screeners. > Adopt the successful McDonald's model, Dzakovic says, of setting clear, > simple rules and deadlines, and supervising workers minute-by-minute to make > sure they're carried out. > > He suggests TSA hire retired Marine or police sergeants to shadow screeners > from start to end of shifts. > > Elson agrees, adding that metal detectors recently went unplugged for so > long at Logan and other airports not because of the plugs, but because of a > lack of supervision. > > He explains that a little red light blinks every time a passenger walks > through the magnetometer portal, and if supervisors were on the ball, they > would have noticed the red light stop blinking. And they would have known > right away that the power was off. > > Short of that, end-of-shift testing of the detectors with metal objects > would have alerted them to the problem - if screeners were properly > supervised to do that, he says. > > "No one is giving the screeners close guidance," said Elson, who talks to > airport-security personnel every day. "They are pretty much left to their > own devices." > > Sullivan concurred. > > "Supervision of the checkpoints was supposed to be enhanced with the TSA > takeover, but it's not happening - as evidenced by sleeping screeners, > unplugged metal detectors and other such incidents since the TSA took over > Feb. 17," he said. > > 2. Aggressively test checkpoints using real weapons. > Dzakovic says dummy guns and bombs used by undercover agents are too easy > for screeners to spot and don't represent the level of sophistication of > today's terrorists. > > He'd also like to see more testing done. Since Sept. 11, the Red Team hasn't > done any tests, he says. > > "Apparently the Red Team is in the process of being dissolved - a team that > proved that security failed for years," he said, suggesting that TSA is no > more interested in hearing about security problems than FAA. > > Asked if the Red Team's been grounded, TSA spokesman Paul Turk said: "If > that's true, I haven't heard it." > > 3. Secure the back side of airports. > Agents say that while everyone is focused on the checkpoints, access to > planes from the gates and tarmac is still relatively easy. > "Someone could just go and throw a bomb in an aircraft baggage hold," Elson > said. > > Vehicles on the ramp aren't properly marked, ramp workers aren't always > displaying their ID badges and security seldom checks badges, Elson says. > > Pilots agree that unrestricted access to the back-end of planes is the > weakest security link. > > 4. Post National Guardsmen on the ramps. > Agents say the most effective role for them is guarding planes, particularly > at night. Posting them inside terminals is just "eye wash" for worried > passengers, agents argue. Many of them don't even keep their M-16s loaded. > > "They're just standing there like trees," Dzakovic said. "They should be > doing night-time patrols of the tarmac." > > "They're best used for perimeter security," Sullivan agreed. > > 5. Inspect planes before the day's first takeoffs. > "Security should be checking planes in the morning, before the first > flight," Dzakovic said. "Right now flight attendants sweep them." > > Cleaning crews are the last ones on the planes at night, he says, and such > service workers still aren't vetted by security. > > 6. Sniff all cargo and mail for bombs. > They go in the belly of planes along with luggage, yet they're only randomly > scanned for bombs. Regular cargo isn't inspected at all. > What's the point of inspecting all checked luggage for explosives if parcels > aren't also inspected? agents wonder. > > 7. Conduct human profiling of passengers. > "That's the single-biggest deterrent to terrorism," Dzakovic said. "Yet we > don't do it because we're still so damned PC (politically correct)." > > He says large groups of young Arab men should be split up and forced to fly > on separate flights. > Sullivan agrees: "There's too much emphasis on stopping bad things, as > opposed to stopping bad people, from getting on planes." > > He suggests TSA deploy security teams at airports to stop and question, or > at least strike up conversations with, passengers acting suspiciously or > fitting the terrorist profile. > > 8. Arm pilots. > Most agents agree pilots need to be allowed to carry guns in the cockpit as > a last line of defense against hijackers. > Some 78 percent of American Airline pilots want to be armed, according to a > recent poll by their union. > > > Paul Sperry is Washington bureau chief for WorldNetDaily. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------