Re: Shoe bomber Part 2

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 AWST article is great but could have done without looking at his face again- thats a face only a mother could love

  Addison Schonland <addison@schonland.com> wrote: You may recall my mentioning that it seemed the French allowed this jerk on
the AA flight -- emphasis in the article is mine, otherwise this comes
srtaight from AW&ST

France, U.S. Probe
CDG Passenger Screening
PIERRE SPARACO/PARIS

Explosives smuggled onto an American Airlines Paris-Miami flight reveal
France's airport security weaknesses

Airport security concerns are growing in the wake of an attempt by a
passenger to bomb an American Airlines Boeing 767 operating from Paris to
Miami.

The continuing investigation is expected to conclude that conventional
passenger screening systems, primarily designed to detect metallic objects,
no longer cover the complete spectrum of risks.

The alarming incident occurred on Dec. 22 half way between Europe and the
U.S. when a passenger, identified as Richard Colvin Reid, a British citizen,
seated next to a window, tried to light a detonator cord leading to
explosives hidden in his shoes. He was quickly subdued by flight attendants
and passengers, including a professional basketball player. Doctors on board
injected Reid with a sedative, and Flight 63 was diverted to Boston's Logan
International Airport. The 767, which carried 185 passengers and 12
crewmembers, was escorted by two USAF F-15s during the final phase of its
diversion to Boston.

The hidden explosives could have resulted in significant damage to the
aircraft, including sudden depressurization. Last week, while Reid was
appearing in a U.S. federal court, the FBI and France's Direction de la
Surveillance du Territoire (DST) were scrutinizing passenger screening
procedures at Paris/Charles de Gaulle (CDG) airport.

THE FBI AND THE DST will seek to determine whether the French police, the
airline or a passenger screening subcontractor failed to enforce tight
security regulations by allowing Reid to board.

"All security systems in place worked perfectly. The problem is that we were
confronted with a scenario that had never been considered," a DGAC French
civil aviation authority official said. He added that despite the dramatic
Sept. 11 warning, aviation security measures do not really take into account
suicide terrorist acts.

In the aftermath of the incident, DGAC has reiterated the need to strictly
comply with security measures. In addition, more police have been made
available to French airports to further protect "security sensitive"
flights. This action was taken in conjunction with Groupe Interministeriel
des Vols Sensibles (GIVS), the French government's security-oriented working
group comprising delegates of key ministries such as defense, interior
affairs and transport. Since Dec. 24, multiple GIVS meetings have focused on
reviewing existing security methods and reevaluating terrorist threats and
political risks.

SHORTLY AFTER the incident, French Transport Minister Jean-Claude Gayssot
and Interior Minister Daniel Vaillant imposed undisclosed measures to
strenghten airport security. They also asked Police aux Frontieres (PAF),
the border police, to determine why Reid, who had raised the suspicions of
security screeners, was allowed to board the flight.

ADP Paris airports authority declined comment. "The airport security level
is not determined by ADP; it is the government's responsibility," ADP
spokesman Jacques Reder said. U.S. passengers traveling from Paris after
Christmas nevertheless were struck by the absence of shoe checking by French
security officers.

A solid four months after Sept. 11, the U.S.-French probe is expected to
reveal weak coordination among security-related organizations. For example,
on Dec. 11, an FAA "information circular" to U.S. airlines stressed that
shoes could be used by terrorists to hide weapons. It is not clear if this
message was sent by the FAA to French authorities, but U.S. airlines would
be free to share it with them, if deemed necessary.

On an in-house hotline, American Chief Executive Donald J. Carty blamed the
French police for letting Reid onto the flight. Carty said it was the
airline that brought Reid's questionable behavior to the attention of the
French border police.

The Flight 63 incident extended over more than 24 hr. On Dec. 21, Reid's
suspicious profile attracted the attention of ICTS International's security
agents on duty at American's CDG check-in facilities. ICTS, a subcontractor,
is a major provider of aviation security services, formed in the early 1980s
by former Israeli military officers and government intelligence experts.

ICTS employees noted that Reid had no verifiable address, no clear travel
objective and was undertaking a long-haul trip without any luggage. He used
cash to buy a round-trip ticket from Paris to Antigua. A PAF hour-long
interrogation of Reid did not lead to any charge or indictment. In addition,
police experts noted that terrorists usually shave their beards to avoid
attracting the attention of security services, but that Reid had not done
so.

IRONICALLY, by the time the interrogation ended, Reid had missed his flight
and spent the night at a nearby airport hotel at American's expense while
his seat reservation was transferred to the following day's Flight 63.
Reid's check-in and boarding went uneventfully as he was recognized by the
same security agents he had encountered the day before.

French government officials are believed to have significantly revised
coordination between multiple security groups, resolved divergent views on
risks and streamlined communication links to achieve better efficiency and
quicker reactions. Last month's incident also could revive a controversy
about PAF's continuing demand for a significantly bigger workforce.

A portion of immigration's working positions at airports frequently are
unmanned, even at peak traffic times, a weakness that creates bottlenecks
and contributes to jeopardizing security. Air France's hub and spokes route
system and marketing strategy also adds to PAF's difficulties. The French
flag carrier has increased peak-hour traffic that requires bigger staffs at
specific times of the day.

A French official cited additional players with key roles in air
transportation security-related issues:


Gendarmerie. The military unit, which reports to the defense minister,
maintains an aviation branch, Gendarmerie des Transports Aeriens. Its
primary role is to ensure airport security outside public zones such as
cargo terminals and on taxiways and runways.

Customs. Part of the finance ministry's responsibility, French Customs
determines and implements precautionary measures covering checked luggage
and freight.

Airlines and cargo forwarders. In addition to the implementation of local
security rules, they have to comply with national regulations. Most foreign
carriers operating to Paris, including U.S. airlines, are outsourcing
security checks.

Security services providers. Although passenger screening remains PAF's
entire responsibility while customs services handle luggage checks,
screening manpower and systems are provided by ADP. However, the airport
authority relies on subcontractors.

Working groups. In addition to DGAC's guidelines, national and local
security working groups coordinate the requirements and funding.
According to French police union leaders, "Reid was searched and searched
again, and nothing more could be done." However, bomb-sniffing dogs were not
called. Police union leaders added that, in the absence of legal
justification for an extension of Reid's detention, any attempt to prolong
the episode could have been ranked as a racial offense, a highly sensitive
issue in France.

On Dec. 28, the European Union (EU) adopted a common position and framework
regulation covering its 15 member states' determination "to combat terrorism
in every shape and form." The EU's initiative, which was prepared long
before the Reid incident, is expected to lay the foundation for greater
international cooperation against terrorism, a U.S. State Dept. official
said.

© January 7, 2002 The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc.
------------------
I therefore continue to state that the French allowed this guy on the plane
despite AA clear misgivings -- I bet AA were forced to do this. Sorry, the
evidence seems pretty clear to me.

Joe Pries Commercial Aviation Photography
Serving the airline industry with quality photography
AOL IM AIRLINE72
http://www.joepries.com


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