You may recall my mentioning that it seemed the French allowed this jerk on the AA flight -- emphasis in the article is mine, otherwise this comes srtaight from AW&ST France, U.S. Probe CDG Passenger Screening PIERRE SPARACO/PARIS Explosives smuggled onto an American Airlines Paris-Miami flight reveal France's airport security weaknesses Airport security concerns are growing in the wake of an attempt by a passenger to bomb an American Airlines Boeing 767 operating from Paris to Miami. The continuing investigation is expected to conclude that conventional passenger screening systems, primarily designed to detect metallic objects, no longer cover the complete spectrum of risks. The alarming incident occurred on Dec. 22 half way between Europe and the U.S. when a passenger, identified as Richard Colvin Reid, a British citizen, seated next to a window, tried to light a detonator cord leading to explosives hidden in his shoes. He was quickly subdued by flight attendants and passengers, including a professional basketball player. Doctors on board injected Reid with a sedative, and Flight 63 was diverted to Boston's Logan International Airport. The 767, which carried 185 passengers and 12 crewmembers, was escorted by two USAF F-15s during the final phase of its diversion to Boston. The hidden explosives could have resulted in significant damage to the aircraft, including sudden depressurization. Last week, while Reid was appearing in a U.S. federal court, the FBI and France's Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) were scrutinizing passenger screening procedures at Paris/Charles de Gaulle (CDG) airport. THE FBI AND THE DST will seek to determine whether the French police, the airline or a passenger screening subcontractor failed to enforce tight security regulations by allowing Reid to board. "All security systems in place worked perfectly. The problem is that we were confronted with a scenario that had never been considered," a DGAC French civil aviation authority official said. He added that despite the dramatic Sept. 11 warning, aviation security measures do not really take into account suicide terrorist acts. In the aftermath of the incident, DGAC has reiterated the need to strictly comply with security measures. In addition, more police have been made available to French airports to further protect "security sensitive" flights. This action was taken in conjunction with Groupe Interministeriel des Vols Sensibles (GIVS), the French government's security-oriented working group comprising delegates of key ministries such as defense, interior affairs and transport. Since Dec. 24, multiple GIVS meetings have focused on reviewing existing security methods and reevaluating terrorist threats and political risks. SHORTLY AFTER the incident, French Transport Minister Jean-Claude Gayssot and Interior Minister Daniel Vaillant imposed undisclosed measures to strenghten airport security. They also asked Police aux Frontieres (PAF), the border police, to determine why Reid, who had raised the suspicions of security screeners, was allowed to board the flight. ADP Paris airports authority declined comment. "The airport security level is not determined by ADP; it is the government's responsibility," ADP spokesman Jacques Reder said. U.S. passengers traveling from Paris after Christmas nevertheless were struck by the absence of shoe checking by French security officers. A solid four months after Sept. 11, the U.S.-French probe is expected to reveal weak coordination among security-related organizations. For example, on Dec. 11, an FAA "information circular" to U.S. airlines stressed that shoes could be used by terrorists to hide weapons. It is not clear if this message was sent by the FAA to French authorities, but U.S. airlines would be free to share it with them, if deemed necessary. On an in-house hotline, American Chief Executive Donald J. Carty blamed the French police for letting Reid onto the flight. Carty said it was the airline that brought Reid's questionable behavior to the attention of the French border police. The Flight 63 incident extended over more than 24 hr. On Dec. 21, Reid's suspicious profile attracted the attention of ICTS International's security agents on duty at American's CDG check-in facilities. ICTS, a subcontractor, is a major provider of aviation security services, formed in the early 1980s by former Israeli military officers and government intelligence experts. ICTS employees noted that Reid had no verifiable address, no clear travel objective and was undertaking a long-haul trip without any luggage. He used cash to buy a round-trip ticket from Paris to Antigua. A PAF hour-long interrogation of Reid did not lead to any charge or indictment. In addition, police experts noted that terrorists usually shave their beards to avoid attracting the attention of security services, but that Reid had not done so. IRONICALLY, by the time the interrogation ended, Reid had missed his flight and spent the night at a nearby airport hotel at American's expense while his seat reservation was transferred to the following day's Flight 63. Reid's check-in and boarding went uneventfully as he was recognized by the same security agents he had encountered the day before. French government officials are believed to have significantly revised coordination between multiple security groups, resolved divergent views on risks and streamlined communication links to achieve better efficiency and quicker reactions. Last month's incident also could revive a controversy about PAF's continuing demand for a significantly bigger workforce. A portion of immigration's working positions at airports frequently are unmanned, even at peak traffic times, a weakness that creates bottlenecks and contributes to jeopardizing security. Air France's hub and spokes route system and marketing strategy also adds to PAF's difficulties. The French flag carrier has increased peak-hour traffic that requires bigger staffs at specific times of the day. A French official cited additional players with key roles in air transportation security-related issues: Gendarmerie. The military unit, which reports to the defense minister, maintains an aviation branch, Gendarmerie des Transports Aeriens. Its primary role is to ensure airport security outside public zones such as cargo terminals and on taxiways and runways. Customs. Part of the finance ministry's responsibility, French Customs determines and implements precautionary measures covering checked luggage and freight. Airlines and cargo forwarders. In addition to the implementation of local security rules, they have to comply with national regulations. Most foreign carriers operating to Paris, including U.S. airlines, are outsourcing security checks. Security services providers. Although passenger screening remains PAF's entire responsibility while customs services handle luggage checks, screening manpower and systems are provided by ADP. However, the airport authority relies on subcontractors. Working groups. In addition to DGAC's guidelines, national and local security working groups coordinate the requirements and funding. According to French police union leaders, "Reid was searched and searched again, and nothing more could be done." However, bomb-sniffing dogs were not called. Police union leaders added that, in the absence of legal justification for an extension of Reid's detention, any attempt to prolong the episode could have been ranked as a racial offense, a highly sensitive issue in France. On Dec. 28, the European Union (EU) adopted a common position and framework regulation covering its 15 member states' determination "to combat terrorism in every shape and form." The EU's initiative, which was prepared long before the Reid incident, is expected to lay the foundation for greater international cooperation against terrorism, a U.S. State Dept. official said. © January 7, 2002 The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. ------------------ I therefore continue to state that the French allowed this guy on the plane despite AA clear misgivings -- I bet AA were forced to do this. Sorry, the evidence seems pretty clear to me.