Re: Hardware Crypto Offload on Kirkwood (SheevaPlug)

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On 05/25/2011 12:06 PM, Gordan Bobic wrote:
> Andrew Haley wrote:
> 
>>> I'm not against NSS - really I'm not. But there are other considerations 
>>> to be taken into account.
>>>
>>> 1) Does NSS have any kind of support for hardware crypto offload? If so, 
>>> I haven't found any references to it (but maybe my google-foo is weak 
>>> today).
>>
>> Interesting question; not sure.
> 
> I think it is an important one to answer, and sooner rather than later. 
> This is particularly important to the ARM community since a lot of 
> (most?) ARMs seem to have a crypto co-processor of some description 
> (Freescales, Kirkwood and Tegra definitely seem to have this, I haven't 
> checked others, but since these are the three classes of devices I own, 
> that's 3 out of 3 - I don't think it's luck/coincidence).
>
> This is particularly important for server applications. ARM is getting 
> some traction in the server market. ZT make a really nice (if expensive) 
> multi-ARM server. I have seriously discussed using ShevaPlugs/GuruPlugs 
> specifically for large scale-out low-power SSL offload with clients. 
> Crypto offload support is already important, and it's importance is only 
> going to go up.

Definitely, which is why it's important to focus on the right library
going forward.

>>> 2) More abstraction (a OpenSSL->NSS shim library), means more bloat, 
>>> more context switching and less performance. Is that really the way 
>>> forward? I mean _really_?
>>
>> For bulk crypto operations an extra call via a shim probably doesn't
>> matter.  For some signature operations it might.
>>
>> It seems like a clean solution from the point of view of application
>> developers, though.
> 
> The other thing that needs to be considered is added complexity and 
> security. I would imagine that since there is an abstraction layer, it 
> introduces additional scope for exploits (buffer overruns, stack 
> smashing, etc.) Is this shim library going to also be FIPS certified? If 
> not then the improved security aspect of NSS vs. OpenSSL comes a lot 
> closer to pure marketing rhetoric (maybe that's where it's at at the 
> moment anyway, I don't claim to be an expert on the subject).

Perhaps, but all this is just speculation AFAICS.  If a shim is
unnecessary then it should be avoided, obviously.

>>> 3) Volume of supported commonly used software - if NSS has a clear
>>> advantage in terms of support base, then so be it, let's all put our
>>> weight behind it. But my perception is that this is not the case.
>>> Everything I touch upon on a daily basis seems to be linked against
>>> OpenSSL rather than NSS.
>>
>> Well, that's not true for everyone, and certainly not for users of
>> GPG.
> 
> I thought it was mentioned on this thread recently that GPG brings it's 
> own implementation anyway. Did I misunderstand?

It does, but I was responding to the claim that OpenSSL was being used
for everything you touch on a daily basis.  If that was not what you
implied, I apologize.  But if most crypto apps are using home-baked
library code, then it doesn't matter which crypto library we move to
because most apps will need to be ported anyway.

>> But the real question is whether one group of Fedora developers is
>> determinedly going to push NSS and the other OpenSSL.  That is not a
>> route to happiness.
> 
> It's not, but losing crypto offload and/or a performance drop-off and 
> bloat due to shimming isn't a happy solution, either.

It's a sight more happy than two groups of Fedora developers fighting
over the One True Crypto Library.  IMO.  :-)

> If we can address those (the latter by sending patches to build
> against NSS upstream so shimming isn't required), then it'd be a
> great idea.

Right.

> But purely in terms of standardizing on a single crypto library -
> has anyone actually performed an exhaustive analysis on how much
> would need to be changed to go either way? The wiki page that has
> been referenced a few times seems distinctly non-exhaustive. Maybe
> my perception is non-representative here, but as I said, all the
> things I get my hands dirty on a regular basis are linked against
> OpenSSL rather than NSS. The pragmatist in me says that maybe that
> makes OpenSSL a better target to standardize on, but I would like to
> see an exhaustive analysis / empirical evidence showing otherwise.

I think it's a mistake to characterize one set of developers as more
pragmatic than the other.  If we end up with a highly-performant
crypto library that some Fedora packages can't be linked against for
legal reasons, that would be -- pragmatically speaking -- a Very Bad
Thing.

Andrew.
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