On 1/30/14, 2:26 PM, Brian Foster wrote:
>> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c
>> > index 511cce9..b575317 100644
>> > --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c
>> > +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c
>> > @@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify(
>> > /* Only fail bad secondaries on a known V5 filesystem */
>> > if (bp->b_bn != XFS_SB_DADDR &&
>> > xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) {
>> > + XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW,
>> > + mp, bp->b_addr);
>> > error = EFSCORRUPTED;
>> > goto out_error;
>> > }
>> > @@ -625,12 +627,8 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify(
>> > error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, true);
>> >
>> > out_error:
>> > - if (error) {
>> > - if (error != EWRONGFS)
>> > - XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW,
>> > - mp, bp->b_addr);
>> > + if (error)
>> > xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, error);
>> > - }
>> > }
> ... but why not leave the corruption output here in out_error, change
> the check to (error == EFSCORRUPTED) and remove the now duplicate
> corruption message in xfs_mount_validate_sb() (or replace it with a
> warn/notice message)? This would catch the other EFSCORRUPTED returns in
> a consistent manner, including another potential duplicate in the write
> verifier. I guess we'd lose a little specificity between the crc failure
> and sb validation, but we could add a warn/notice for the former too.
>
> Brian
>
Well, I went back and forth on this. It's probably philosophical. ;)
Should we emit the corruption error at the point of corruption detection,
or at a higher level? I guess my concern was that while *this* caller
might catch the return & yell, if another caller got added it might not.
Putting it at the point of detection seemed foolproof in that regard.
-Eric
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