On 01/29/2014 12:11 AM, Eric Sandeen wrote: > Today, if > > xfs_sb_read_verify > xfs_sb_verify > xfs_mount_validate_sb > > detects superblock corruption, it'll be extremely noisy, dumping > 2 stacks, 2 hexdumps, etc. > > This is because we call XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR in xfs_mount_validate_sb > as well as in xfs_sb_read_verify. > > Also, *any* errors in xfs_mount_validate_sb which are not corruption > per se; things like too-big-blocksize, bad version, bad magic, v1 dirs, > rw-incompat etc - things which do not return EFSCORRUPTED - will > still do the whole XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR spew when xfs_sb_read_verify > sees any error at all. And it suggests to the user that they > should run xfs_repair, even if the root cause of the mount failure > is a simple incompatibility. > > I'll submit that the probably-not-corrupted errors don't warrant > this much noise, so this patch removes the high-level > XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR which was firing for every error return > except EWRONGFS. > > It also adds one to the path which detects a failed checksum. > > The idea is, if it's really _corruption_ we can call > XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR at the point of detection. More benign > incompatibilities can do a little printk & fail the mount without > so much drama. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > > I could see an argument where we might still want the hexdump > for things like bad magic - ok, just what *was* the magic? But > I think we do need to reserve the oops-mimicing-backtraces for > the most severe problems. Discuss. ;) > This seems pretty reasonable to me, particularly if pretty much any error via the xfs_sb_verify() path dumps corruption noise... > diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c > index 511cce9..b575317 100644 > --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c > +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_sb.c > @@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify( > /* Only fail bad secondaries on a known V5 filesystem */ > if (bp->b_bn != XFS_SB_DADDR && > xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) { > + XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, > + mp, bp->b_addr); > error = EFSCORRUPTED; > goto out_error; > } > @@ -625,12 +627,8 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify( > error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, true); > > out_error: > - if (error) { > - if (error != EWRONGFS) > - XFS_CORRUPTION_ERROR(__func__, XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, > - mp, bp->b_addr); > + if (error) > xfs_buf_ioerror(bp, error); > - } > } ... but why not leave the corruption output here in out_error, change the check to (error == EFSCORRUPTED) and remove the now duplicate corruption message in xfs_mount_validate_sb() (or replace it with a warn/notice message)? This would catch the other EFSCORRUPTED returns in a consistent manner, including another potential duplicate in the write verifier. I guess we'd lose a little specificity between the crc failure and sb validation, but we could add a warn/notice for the former too. Brian > > /* > > _______________________________________________ > xfs mailing list > xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx > http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs > _______________________________________________ xfs mailing list xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx http://oss.sgi.com/mailman/listinfo/xfs