On Sun, 27 Oct 2002, Eric Pouech wrote: > > Well, while I agree with the general sentiment, this is technically not > > quite right. In i386 protected mode, you cannot jump directly to code with > > a different privilege level (it'd cause a GPF/SIGSEGV to try), it must be > > done through a "gate" (typically an interrupt). Passing through such a > > privilege-transition gate also implies switching to a similarly-privileged > > stack (before the return address is pushed), so you cannot push your own > > return address onto the kernel's privileged stack. And you probably can't > > even get the address of the kernel interrupt handler (the IDT can be > > protected from being read). This doesn't make Wine any more secure though, > > of course... > I wasn't talking about jumping directly into the kernel Hm? I was replying to Sylvain, who was talking about that. _______________________________________________ wine-users mailing list wine-users@winehq.com http://www.winehq.com/mailman/listinfo/wine-users