On 15:31 Mon 16 Mar , Jan Lübbe wrote: > On Mo, 2015-03-16 at 14:51 +0100, Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD wrote: > > > > The other pb I see is this one where and do you plan to store the RO x509 > > > > the trusted one. > > > > > > Sorry, I can't parse this. > > where do we store the trusted keys/cert need to be secured or inaccessible > > except crypto API > > (The following depends on prohibiting any unauthenticated access to the > barebox console.) > > If you just use a chain of signed code like with HAB on i.MX, every cert > is verified by the previous step (up to the SRK table hash), so there is > no need to additionally protect certs against modification. Any modified > cert would result in a verification error. In this setup there is no > secret information on the device at all. > > When doing this without support from the SoC's ROM code, you could store > barebox (with compiled-in master public key(s)) in RO flash. Against an > attacker without physical access, this results in the same security > properties. You couldn't update the RO barebox, tough (only boot another > one second stage). I agree with you I said the same my key point is if we do allow console access we need be sure at 100% that they can not tempered with the trusted key in RAM and barebox binary and malloc space Best Regards, J. _______________________________________________ barebox mailing list barebox@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/barebox
