On 08.03.21 21:24, Lennart Poettering wrote: > The way I read the FIDO2 spec the PIN is sent over the USB wire encrypted > with a shared secret that authenticator and host first securely agreed > on, to make such man-in-the-middle attacks are not possible. Moreover, > once the PIN is configured on the device it is never passed at all > anymore, but just hashes of it when authenticating. > > Hence, to my knowledge there's no reason to second guess that and do > another level of password checking separately from that. > It would be easy for us to combine the FIDO2 secret we acquire with a > user supplied pw that never is seen by the FIDO2 libraries, all before > passing it to the next layer, but as mentioned I don't think this is > necessary, the FIDO2 spec is well enough designed to make this > unnecessary. That sounds plausible and I no longer have any concerns. Thanks! _______________________________________________ systemd-devel mailing list systemd-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel