On 07.03.21 23:34, Lennart Poettering wrote: > Right now whether to require the FIDO2 PIN is not configurable. We > could make it configurable though, so that you could use it in 1FA > situations. I myself am only interested in 2FA; I misread the documentation as the current implementation being 1FA, but that misunderstanding is now resolved. Thanks! If I understand src/cryptsetup/{cryptsetup-fido2,cryptsetup}.c correctly, then the PIN is used as input to the security token, and whatever the token returns is base64-encoded and then used as the key for LUKS, right? If so, I wonder whether this isn't vulnerable to physical USB attacks (see [1] for an example how simple this can be). As I mentioned earlier, I speculate that the fido2luks project hashes the password before FIDO2, and then again with the FIDO2 response, to alleviate this. [1] https://ha.cking.ch/s8_data_line_locator/ _______________________________________________ systemd-devel mailing list systemd-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel