On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 2:14 PM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map
> without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled.
>
> This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivilege
unprivileged.
> setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this
> functionality will need to check to see if they use setgroups or
> init_groups, and if they don't they can be fixed by simply
> disabling of setgroups before they run.
"disabling setgroups before writing to gid_map"?
The code is:
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 3d128f91ced3..459c7f647072 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -828,6 +828,11 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
> if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
> return true;
> + } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
> + kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
> + if (!userns_setgroups_allowed(ns) &&
> + gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))
> + return true;
> }
> }
>
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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