On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Classic unix permission checks have an interesting feature, the group
> permissions for a file can be set to less than the other permissions
> on a file. Occassionally this is used deliberately to give a certain
> group of users fewer permissions than the default.
>
> Overlooking negative groups has resulted in the permission checks for
> setting up a group mapping in a user namespace to be too lax. Tighten
> the permission checks in new_idmap_permitted to ensure that mapping
> uids and gids into user namespaces without privilege will not result
> in new combinations of credentials being available to the users.
>
> When setting mappings without privilege only the creator of the user
> namespace is interesting as all other users that have CAP_SETUID over
> the user namespace will also have CAP_SETUID over the user namespaces
> parent. So the scope of the unprivileged check is reduced to just
> the case where cred->euid is the namespace creator.
>
> For setting a uid mapping without privilege only euid is considered as
> setresuid can set uid, suid and fsuid from euid without privielege
> making any combination of uids possible with user namespaces already
> possible without them.
>
> For now seeting a gid mapping without privilege is removed. The only
> possible set of credentials that would be safe without a gid mapping
> (egid without any supplementary groups) just doesn't happen in practice
> so would simply lead to unused untested code.
>
> setgroups is modified to fail not only when the group ids do not
> map but also when there are no gid mappings at all, preventing
> setgroups(0, NULL) from succeeding when gid mappings have not been
> established.
>
> For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
> and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
> includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c
>
> Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the
> addition of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups
> is disabled setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.
>
> For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map with
> privilege this change will have no effect on them.
>
> This should fix CVE-2014-8989.
>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> +static inline bool gid_mapping_possible(const struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> + return ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
> +}
> +
Can you rename this to userns_may_setgroups or something like that?
To me, gid_mapping_possible sounds like you're allowed to map gids,
which sounds like the opposite condition, and it doesn't explain what
the point is.
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index aa312b0dc3ec..51d65b444951 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -812,16 +812,19 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
> struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
> {
> - /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
> - if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
> + const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
> +
> + /* Allow a mapping without capabilities when allowing the root
> + * of the user namespace capabilities restricted to that id
> + * will not change the set of credentials available to that
> + * user.
> + */
> + if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
> + uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
What's uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) for? This should already be covered by:
if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out;
(except that I don't know why cap_valid(cap_setid) is checked -- this
ought to be enforced for projid_map, too, right?)
> u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
> if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
> kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
> - if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
> - return true;
> - } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
> - kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
> - if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
> + if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
Why'd you change this from fsuid to euid?
--Andy
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