On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 02:10:20PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > The value av7110->debi_virt is stored in DMA memory, and it is assigned
> > to data, and thus data[0] can be modified at any time by malicious
> > hardware. In this case, "if (data[0] < 2)" can be passed, but then
> > data[0] can be changed into a large number, which may cause buffer
> > overflow when the code "av7110->ci_slot[data[0]]" is used.
> >
> > To fix this possible bug, data[0] is assigned to a local variable, which
> > replaces the use of data[0].
>
> I'm pretty sure hardware capable of manipulating memory can work
> around any such checks, but...
>
> > +++ b/drivers/media/pci/ttpci/av7110.c
> > @@ -424,14 +424,15 @@ static void debiirq(unsigned long cookie)
> > case DATA_CI_GET:
> > {
> > u8 *data = av7110->debi_virt;
> > + u8 data_0 = data[0];
> >
> > - if ((data[0] < 2) && data[2] == 0xff) {
> > + if (data_0 < 2 && data[2] == 0xff) {
> > int flags = 0;
> > if (data[5] > 0)
> > flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_PRESENT;
> > if (data[5] > 5)
> > flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_READY;
> > - av7110->ci_slot[data[0]].flags = flags;
> > + av7110->ci_slot[data_0].flags = flags;
>
> This does not even do what it says. Compiler is still free to access
> data[0] multiple times. It needs READ_ONCE() to be effective.
Yes, it seems quite dubious to me. If we *really* want to guard against
rogue hardware here, the whole DMA buffer should be copied. I don't
think it's worth it, a rogue PCI device can do much more harm.
--
Regards,
Laurent Pinchart
