Re: [PATCH for-stable-4.14 42/48] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

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On Fri, 25 Oct 2019 at 17:25, Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 04:37:12PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >On Thu, 24 Oct 2019 at 16:34, Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> On 10/24/19 1:48 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> > From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
> >> >
> >> > [ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ]
> >> >
> >> > Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
> >> > by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.
> >> >
> >> > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
> >> > Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@xxxxxxx>
> >> > Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
> >> > Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@xxxxxxxx>
> >> > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
> >> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >> > ---
> >> >  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 15 ++++++++-------
> >> >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> > index bf6d8aa9b45a..647c533cfd90 100644
> >> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> >> > @@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> >> >       config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0);
> >> >  }
> >> >
> >> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> >> >  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> >> >  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> >> >
> >> > @@ -217,11 +216,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
> >> >           ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
> >> >               cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
> >> >
> >> > -     install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
> >> > +     if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
> >> > +             install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
> >> >
> >> >       return 1;
> >> >  }
> >> > -#endif       /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
> >> >
> >> >  DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
> >> >
> >> > @@ -457,7 +456,6 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> >> >       .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,                 \
> >> >       CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
> >> >
> >> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> >> >  /*
> >> >   * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
> >> >   */
> >> > @@ -489,6 +487,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> >> >       if (!need_wa)
> >> >               return false;
> >> >
> >> > +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
> >> > +             pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
> >> > +             __hardenbp_enab = false;
> >>
> >> This breaks when building, because __hardenbp_enab is declared in the next patch:
> >>
> >> $ make -j32 defconfig && make -j32
> >>
> >> [..]
> >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c: In function ‘check_branch_predictor’:
> >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:492:3: error: ‘__hardenbp_enab’ undeclared (first
> >> use in this function)
> >>    __hardenbp_enab = false;
> >>    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:492:3: note: each undeclared identifier is reported
> >> only once for each function it appears in
> >> make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:326: arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.o] Error 1
> >> make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
> >>
> >
> >Indeed, but as discussed, this matches the state of both mainline and
> >v4.19, which carry these patches in the same [wrong] order as well.
> >
> >Greg should confirm, but as I understand it, it is preferred to be
> >bug-compatible with mainline rather than fixing problems when spotting
> >them while doing the backport.
>
> Is it just patch ordering? If so I'd rather fix it, there's no reason to
> carry this issue into the stable trees.
>
> We reserve "bug compatibility" for functional issues that are not yet
> fixed upstream, it doesn't seem to be the case here.
>

The patches don't apply cleanly in the opposite order.




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