Re: [PATCH for-stable-4.14 42/48] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

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On Thu, 24 Oct 2019 at 16:34, Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On 10/24/19 1:48 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
> >
> > [ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ]
> >
> > Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
> > by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@xxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@xxxxxxx>
> > Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
> > Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@xxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 15 ++++++++-------
> >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > index bf6d8aa9b45a..647c533cfd90 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> > @@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
> >       config_sctlr_el1(SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0);
> >  }
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> >  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> >  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> >
> > @@ -217,11 +216,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
> >           ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
> >               cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
> >
> > -     install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
> > +     if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
> > +             install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
> >
> >       return 1;
> >  }
> > -#endif       /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
> >
> >  DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
> >
> > @@ -457,7 +456,6 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> >       .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,                 \
> >       CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> >  /*
> >   * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
> >   */
> > @@ -489,6 +487,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> >       if (!need_wa)
> >               return false;
> >
> > +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
> > +             pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
> > +             __hardenbp_enab = false;
>
> This breaks when building, because __hardenbp_enab is declared in the next patch:
>
> $ make -j32 defconfig && make -j32
>
> [..]
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c: In function ‘check_branch_predictor’:
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:492:3: error: ‘__hardenbp_enab’ undeclared (first
> use in this function)
>    __hardenbp_enab = false;
>    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:492:3: note: each undeclared identifier is reported
> only once for each function it appears in
> make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:326: arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.o] Error 1
> make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
>

Indeed, but as discussed, this matches the state of both mainline and
v4.19, which carry these patches in the same [wrong] order as well.

Greg should confirm, but as I understand it, it is preferred to be
bug-compatible with mainline rather than fixing problems when spotting
them while doing the backport.



> > +             return false;
> > +     }
> > +
> >       /* forced off */
> >       if (__nospectre_v2) {
> >               pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
> > @@ -500,7 +504,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
> >
> >       return (need_wa > 0);
> >  }
> > -#endif
> >
> >  const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
> >  #if  defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
> > @@ -640,13 +643,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
> >               ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
> >       },
> >  #endif
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> >       {
> >               .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
> >               .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
> >               .matches = check_branch_predictor,
> >       },
> > -#endif
> >       {
> >               .desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
> >               .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,




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