On Mon 2019-01-14 00:12:59, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Jan 2019, Pavel Machek wrote:
>
> > That one really is Intel-specific (not even all x86s are affectd). Same
> > for Meltdown.
>
> At least for Meltdown, your claim is simply not correct.
You are right, there may be few ARM chips affected by meltdown.
I don't know about any non-Intel affected by l1tf.
...and its documentation is just plain wrong, explaining I'm protected
when I'm not...
commit f372cd79be31382ae6030a1f15638cc7fe9eeb9f
Author: Pavel <pavel@xxxxxx>
Date: Thu Jan 3 00:48:40 2019 +0100
Ok, I guess L1TF was a lot of fun, and there was not time for a good
documentation.
There's admin guide that is written as an advertisment, and
unfortunately is slightly "inaccurate" at places (to the point of
lying).
Plus, I believe it should go to x86/ directory, as this is really
Intel issue, and not anything ARM (or RISC-V) people need to know.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx>
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
index 9af9773..05c5422 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
========================
-L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
-speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
-when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
-for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability on most recent Intel x86
+CPUs which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
+available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry
+controlling the virtual address, which is used for the access, has the
+Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
Affected processors
-------------------
@@ -76,12 +77,14 @@ Attack scenarios
deterministic and more practical.
The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
- inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
- impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
- marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
-
- A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
- malicious user space applications.
+ inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no measurable
+ performance impact in most configurations. The kernel ensures that
+ the address bits of PTEs, which are not marked present, never point
+ to cacheable physical memory space. On x86-32, this physical memory
+ needs to be limited to 2GiB to make mitigation effective.
+
+ Mitigation is present in kernels v4.19 and newer, and in
+ recent -stable kernels.
2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
--
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(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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