On Thu, Nov 15, 2018 at 12:20 AM Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 3:00 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Dmitry,
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 02:28:56PM -0800, 'Dmitry Torokhov' via syzkaller-bugs wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 2:05 PM Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 10:55 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > >
> > > > > When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
> > > > > copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
> > > > > When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
> > > > > sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Alternatively,
> > > > > information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write
> > > > > to the file descriptor. Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.
> > > > >
> > > > > No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and
> > > > > UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to
> > > > > UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
> > > > > Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
> > > > > helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.
> > > > >
> > > > > Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > > > > Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
> > > > > Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v3.6+
> > > > > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > >
> > > > Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > >
> > > > > ---
> > > > > drivers/hid/uhid.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> > > > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> > > > > index 3c55073136064..051639c09f728 100644
> > > > > --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> > > > > +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> > > > > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> > > > >
> > > > > #include <linux/atomic.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/compat.h>
> > > > > +#include <linux/cred.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/device.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/fs.h>
> > > > > #include <linux/hid.h>
> > > > > @@ -722,6 +723,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
> > > > >
> > > > > switch (uhid->input_buf.type) {
> > > > > case UHID_CREATE:
> > > > > + /*
> > > > > + * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is
> > > > > + * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated
> > > > > + * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().
> > > > > + */
> > >
> > > uhid is a privileged interface so we would go from root to less
> > > privileged (if at all). If non-privileged process can open uhid it can
> > > construct virtual keyboard and inject whatever keystrokes it wants.
> > >
> > > Also, instead of disallowing access, can we ensure that we switch back
> > > to USER_DS before trying to load data from the user pointer?
> > >
> >
> > Actually uhid doesn't have any capability checks, so it's up to userspace to
> > assign permissions to the device node.
>
> Yes. There are quite a few such instances where kernel does not bother
> implementing superfluous checks and instead relies on userspace to
> provide sane environment. IIRC nobody in the kernel enforces root
> filesystem not be accessible to ordinary users, it is done with
> generic permission checks.
>
> > I think it's best not to make
> > assumptions about how the interface will be used and to be consistent with how
> > other ->write() methods in the kernel handle the misfeature where a __user
> > pointer in the write() or read() payload is dereferenced.
>
> I can see that you might want to check credentials, etc, if interface
> can be accessed by unprivileged process, however is it a big no no for
> uhid/userio/uinput devices.
Yep, any sane distribution would restrict the permissions of
uhid/userio/uinput to only be accessed by root. If that ever changes,
there is already an issue with the system and it was compromised
either by a terribly dizzy sysadmin.
>
> > Temporarily switching
> > to USER_DS would only avoid one of the two problems.
>
> So because of the above there is only one problem. If your system
> opened access to uhid to random processes you have much bigger
> problems than exposing some data from a suid binary. You can spam "rm
> -rf .; rm -rf /" though uhid if there is interactive session
> somewhere.
>
> >
> > Do you think the proposed restrictions would actually break anything?
>
> It would break if someone uses UHID_CREATE with sendpage. I do not
> know if anyone does. If we were certain there are no users we'd simply
> removed UHID_CREATE altogether.
AFAICT, there are 2 users of uhid:
- bluez for BLE devices (using HID over GATT)
- hid-replay for debugging.
There might be a few other users that are making some user space
driver out of opencv, but I wouldn't expect those to be really
widespread.
IIRC, bluez uses UHID_CREATE2 and hid-replay should also (or ought to
be, but this can be easily fixed as I maintain the code and I am the
almost sole user).
Regarding the sendpage fix, doesn't David's patch fixes the issue
already (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10682549/).
I am fine applying whatever patch that fixes the security issues, as
long as it doesn't break bluez nor the hid-replay uses I have for
debugging and regression testing.
Cheers,
Benjamin
>
> >
> > - Eric
> >
> > > > > + if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) {
> > > > > + pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n",
> > > > > + task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
> > > > > + ret = -EACCES;
> > > > > + goto unlock;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf);
> > > > > break;
> > > > > case UHID_CREATE2:
> > > > > --
>
> Thanks.
>
> --
> Dmitry
