+cc Andy
On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 7:03 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
> copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
> When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
> sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Therefore, UHID_CREATE
> must not be allowed in this case.
>
> For consistency and to make sure all current and future uhid commands
> are covered, apply the restriction to uhid_char_write() as a whole
> rather than to UHID_CREATE specifically.
>
> Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
> Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
> helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Wheeeee, it found something! :)
> Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
> Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v3.6+
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> drivers/hid/uhid.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> index 3c55073136064..e94c5e248b56e 100644
> --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
> @@ -705,6 +705,12 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
> int ret;
> size_t len;
>
> + if (uaccess_kernel()) { /* payload may contain a __user pointer */
> + pr_err_once("%s: process %d (%s) called from kernel context, this is not allowed.\n",
> + __func__, task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
> + return -EACCES;
> + }
If this file can conceivably be opened by a process that doesn't have
root privileges, this check should be something along the lines of
ib_safe_file_access() or sg_check_file_access().
Checking for uaccess_kernel() prevents the symptom that syzkaller
notices - a user being able to cause a kernel memory access -, but it
doesn't deal with the case where a user opens a file descriptor to
this device and tricks a more privileged process into writing into it
(e.g. by passing it to a suid binary as stdout or stderr).
Looking closer, I wonder whether this kind of behavior is limited to
the UHID_CREATE request, which has a comment on it saying "/*
Obsolete! Use UHID_CREATE2. */". If we could keep this kind of ugly
kludge away from the code paths you're supposed to be using, that
would be nice...
