Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: linux-wireless@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@xxxxxxxxx> --- Here's the backport for 3.18. net/mac80211/wpa.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 983527a4c1ab..49592c7e4199 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <net/mac80211.h> #include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include "ieee80211_i.h" #include "michael.h" @@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); - if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0) + if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0) goto mic_fail; /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ @@ -520,7 +521,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) queue = rx->security_idx; - if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { + if (crypto_memneq(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { key->u.ccmp.replays++; return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } @@ -771,7 +772,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) bip_aad(skb, aad); ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic); - if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) { + if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) { key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } -- 2.13.1