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By the way, Amos. I have an idea spinning around. Is it possible to specify the SSL error of the unknown certificate issuer for the correct processing of the situation when the client does not have a proxy certificate installed? This would greatly facilitate the task that we are discussing. We're
can, in this case, just use deny_info to redirect client to
proxy page. ;-) 26.03.2018 04:05, Yuri пишет:
And yes, HTTPS is insecure by design and all our actions does not it less insecure :-D 26.03.2018 04:03, Yuri пишет:26.03.2018 03:55, Amos Jeffries пишет:On 26/03/18 10:16, Yuri wrote:26.03.2018 03:02, Amos Jeffries пишет:On 26/03/18 09:49, Yuri wrote:26.03.2018 02:45, Amos Jeffries пишет:On 26/03/18 04:41, Yuri wrote:25.03.2018 20:32, Matus UHLAR - fantomas пишет:Le 25/03/2018 à 13:08, Yuri a écrit :The problem is not install proxy CA. The problem is identify client has no proxy CA and redirect, and do it only one time.On 25.03.18 13:46, Nicolas Kovacs wrote:That is exactly the problem. And I have yet to find a solution for that. Current method is instruct everyone - with a printed paper in the office - to connect to proxy.company-name.lan and then get further instructions from the page. This works, but an automatic splash page would be more elegant.25.03.2018 18:42, Matus UHLAR - fantomas пишет:impossible and unsafe. The CA must be installed before such splash page showsOn 25.03.18 18:44, Yuri wrote:Possible. "Safe/Unsafe" should not be discussion when SSL Bump implemented already.it's possible to install splash page, but not install trusted authority certificate. Using such authority on a proxy is the MITM attack and whole SSL has been designed to prevent this.Heh. If SSL designed - why SSL Bump itself possible? ;):-PAs all our SSL-Bump documentation should be saying: when TLS is used properly SSL-Bump *does not work*. A client checking the cert validity and producing _its own_ error page about missing/unknown/untrusted CA is one of those cases. Since the client is producing the "page" itself there is no possibility of Squid replacing that with something else.Amos, squid is irrelevant here. "Used properly" and "Implemented properly", and, especially, "Designed properly" - which means "Secure by design", like SSH or The Onion Router. HTTPS is *NOT*.You are missing the point. Sometimes TLS *is* implemented properly. Squid is very relevant here because it is the agent producing the un-verifiable certificate. The certificate is un-verifiable exactly because Squids own CA is being used and the client does not trust that CA.Waaaaaaaa, Amos, why you say "unverifiable"?Because that is the situation. The client software cannot silently verify the certificate nor automatically install the not-trusted CA to cause that *previous* verification attempt to succeed.Sure. User always should: a) Have root/administrative privilegies to install any CA in trusted store on client b) Device always asks users "Hey, somebody tries to install CA with fingerprint blah-blah-blah.... you trust them? Install? (Yes/No)" We're not talking about forced silently push proxy CA to client, right?You can show CA to users,Er, you are now going in circles. The initial problem was that it is not possible to verify the cert automatically *without* showing the user things. Requiring the user to see something to get around that problem ...Yes. We're want just to determine - is proxy CA installed? and if not, redirect user to page to make desicion - install/not install. Get internet/remain locally ;) On this page we're can inform user about all require things: our CPS, our privacy policy, warnings, legal issues, CA fingerprint, CA issuer etc. ;) This seems better? All same like adult CA does :) We're all understand we're can't silently push any CA to client ;) This is illegal, technically impossible, insecure....... ;)Amos _______________________________________________ squid-users mailing list squid-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.squid-cache.org/listinfo/squid-users -- "C++ seems like a language suitable for firing other people's legs." ***************************** * C++20 : Bug to the future * ***************************** |
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