26.03.2018 03:55, Amos Jeffries пишет: > On 26/03/18 10:16, Yuri wrote: >> >> 26.03.2018 03:02, Amos Jeffries пишет: >>> On 26/03/18 09:49, Yuri wrote: >>>> 26.03.2018 02:45, Amos Jeffries пишет: >>>>> On 26/03/18 04:41, Yuri wrote: >>>>>> 25.03.2018 20:32, Matus UHLAR - fantomas пишет: >>>>>>>>>> Le 25/03/2018 à 13:08, Yuri a écrit : >>>>>>>>>>> The problem is not install proxy CA. The problem is identify client >>>>>>>>>>> has no proxy CA and redirect, and do it only one time. >>>>>>>>> On 25.03.18 13:46, Nicolas Kovacs wrote: >>>>>>>>>> That is exactly the problem. And I have yet to find a solution for >>>>>>>>>> that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Current method is instruct everyone - with a printed paper in the >>>>>>>>>> office >>>>>>>>>> - to connect to proxy.company-name.lan and then get further >>>>>>>>>> instructions >>>>>>>>>> from the page. This works, but an automatic splash page would be more >>>>>>>>>> elegant. >>>>>>>> 25.03.2018 18:42, Matus UHLAR - fantomas пишет: >>>>>>>>> impossible and unsafe. The CA must be installed before such splash >>>>>>>>> page shows >>>>>>> On 25.03.18 18:44, Yuri wrote: >>>>>>>> Possible. "Safe/Unsafe" should not be discussion when SSL Bump >>>>>>>> implemented already. >>>>>>> it's possible to install splash page, but not install trusted authority >>>>>>> certificate. Using such authority on a proxy is the MITM attack and >>>>>>> whole >>>>>>> SSL has been designed to prevent this. >>>>>> Heh. If SSL designed - why SSL Bump itself possible? ;):-P >>>>> As all our SSL-Bump documentation should be saying: >>>>> >>>>> when TLS is used properly SSL-Bump *does not work*. >>>>> >>>>> A client checking the cert validity and producing _its own_ error page >>>>> about missing/unknown/untrusted CA is one of those cases. Since the >>>>> client is producing the "page" itself there is no possibility of Squid >>>>> replacing that with something else. >>>> Amos, >>>> >>>> squid is irrelevant here. "Used properly" and "Implemented properly", >>>> and, especially, "Designed properly" - which means "Secure by design", >>>> like SSH or The Onion Router. >>>> >>>> HTTPS is *NOT*. >>>> >>> You are missing the point. Sometimes TLS *is* implemented properly. >>> >>> Squid is very relevant here because it is the agent producing the >>> un-verifiable certificate. The certificate is un-verifiable exactly >>> because Squids own CA is being used and the client does not trust that CA. >> Waaaaaaaa, Amos, why you say "unverifiable"? > Because that is the situation. The client software cannot silently > verify the certificate nor automatically install the not-trusted CA to > cause that *previous* verification attempt to succeed. Sure. User always should: a) Have root/administrative privilegies to install any CA in trusted store on client b) Device always asks users "Hey, somebody tries to install CA with fingerprint blah-blah-blah.... you trust them? Install? (Yes/No)" We're not talking about forced silently push proxy CA to client, right? > >> You can show CA to users, > Er, you are now going in circles. > > The initial problem was that it is not possible to verify the cert > automatically *without* showing the user things. Requiring the user to > see something to get around that problem ... Yes. We're want just to determine - is proxy CA installed? and if not, redirect user to page to make desicion - install/not install. Get internet/remain locally ;) On this page we're can inform user about all require things: our CPS, our privacy policy, warnings, legal issues, CA fingerprint, CA issuer etc. ;) This seems better? All same like adult CA does :) We're all understand we're can't silently push any CA to client ;) This is illegal, technically impossible, insecure....... ;) > > Amos > _______________________________________________ > squid-users mailing list > squid-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.squid-cache.org/listinfo/squid-users -- "C++ seems like a language suitable for firing other people's legs." ***************************** * C++20 : Bug to the future * *****************************
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