Re: Bug in SELinux SCTP ASCONF handling

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On Tue, May 31, 2022 at 1:05 PM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hello everyone,
>
> Investigating the yet still spuriously failing SCTP ASCONF test [1]

FWIW, I haven't seen failures with the SCTP tests when doing my
testing, but perhaps I've just been lucky with the timing windows.

> has led me to realize that the SCTP_PARAM_* chunk handling is in fact
> severely flawed. The SCTP_PARAM_* code paths reuse the
> security_sctp_bind_connect() hook, but that hook uses the current
> task's sid when checking the socket::connect permission, which is not
> correct, since there is no guarantee on the task context in which the
> incoming ASCONF packet will be processed.
>
> The relevant selinux-testsuite test [1] expects the subject sid to be
> the one of the server, which has been true only by accident, as SCTP
> often processes the incoming ASCONF chunk via softirq right after it
> is sent.
>
> This seems tricky to fix, as we don't have any appropriate subject
> context at hand at the time of receiving the ASCONF chunk... Any
> ideas?

I had some interruptions at home this afternoon, but I'll take a look
tonight to see if anything comes to mind.  Although I believe you know
that code fairly well so I'm not very confident that I'll be able to
spot anything new.

-- 
paul-moore.com



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