Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On 27.7.2020 18.39, Dominick Grift wrote:
>> Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>
>>> On 27.7.2020 16.57, Dominick Grift wrote:
>>>> Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> List all access control methods available for networking and provide
>>>>> examples for each.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> v2: address comments from Richard Haines
>>>>> ---
>>>>> src/network_statements.md | 2 +-
>>>>> src/network_support.md | 170 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>>>> 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/src/network_statements.md b/src/network_statements.md
>>>>> index ef1c873..357c3b1 100644
>>>>> --- a/src/network_statements.md
>>>>> +++ b/src/network_statements.md
>>>>> @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ the interface to a security context.
>>>>> <tr>
>>>>> <td><code>packet_context</code></td>
>>>>> <td><p>The security context allocated packets. Note that these are defined but unused.</p>
>>>>> -<p>The iptables(8)/nftables(8) <a href="network_support.md#secmark">SECMARK services</a> should be used to label packets.</p></td>
>>>>> +<p>The iptables(8)/nftables(8) <a
>>>>> href="network_support.md#internal-labeling-secmark">SECMARK
>>>>> services</a> should be used to label packets.</p></td>
>>>>> </tr>
>>>>> </tbody>
>>>>> </table>
>>>>> diff --git a/src/network_support.md b/src/network_support.md
>>>>> index 309e863..6f9896b 100644
>>>>> --- a/src/network_support.md
>>>>> +++ b/src/network_support.md
>>>>> @@ -1,20 +1,17 @@
>>>>> # SELinux Networking Support
>>>>> -SELinux supports the following types of network labeling:
>>>>> +SELinux supports several methods for access control of networks. These are
>>>>> -**Internal labeling** - This is where network objects are
>>>>> labeled and
>>>>> -managed internally within a single machine (i.e. their labels are not
>>>>> -transmitted as part of the session with remote systems). There are two
>>>>> -types supported: SECMARK and NetLabel. There was a service known as
>>>>> -'compat_net' controls, however that was removed in kernel 2.6.30.
>>>>> +* Packet labeling: class `packet`
>>>>> +* Peer labeling: class `peer`
>>>>> +* Interface control: class `netif`
>>>>> +* Network node control: class `node`
>>>>> +* TCP/UDP/SCTP/DCCP ports: class `port`
>>>>> -**Labeled Networking** - This is where labels are passed to/from
>>>>> remote
>>>>> -systems where they can be interpreted and a MAC policy enforced on each
>>>>> -system. There are three types supported: Labeled IPSec, CIPSO
>>>>> -(Commercial IP Security Option) and CALIPSO (Common Architecture Label
>>>>> -IPv6 Security Option)
>>>>> +Networking support is not enabled by default. It can be enabled either
>>>>> +the policy capabilities or by loading SECMARK rules.
>>>>> -There are two policy capability options that can be set within
>>>>> policy
>>>>> +There are three policy capability options that can be set within policy
>>>>> using the `policycap` statement that affect networking configuration:
>>>>> **`network_peer_controls`** - This is always enabled in the
>>>>> latest
>>>>> @@ -37,8 +34,22 @@ The policy capability settings are available in userspace via the
>>>>> SELinux filesystem as shown in the
>>>>> [**SELinux Filesystem**](lsm_selinux.md#selinux-filesystem) section.
>>>>> -To support peer labeling, CIPSO and CALIPSO the NetLabel tools
>>>>> need to
>>>>> -be installed:
>>>>> +SELinux supports the following types of network labeling:
>>>>> +
>>>>> +**Internal labeling** - This is where network objects are labeled and
>>>>> +managed internally within a single machine (i.e. their labels are not
>>>>> +transmitted as part of the session with remote systems). There are two
>>>>> +types supported: SECMARK and NetLabel. There was a service known as
>>>>> +'compat_net' controls, however that was removed in kernel 2.6.30.
>>>>> +
>>>>> +**Labeled Networking** - This is where labels are passed to/from remote
>>>>> +systems where they can be interpreted and a MAC policy enforced on each
>>>>> +system. There are three types supported: Labeled IPSec, CIPSO
>>>>> +(Commercial IP Security Option) and CALIPSO (Common Architecture Label
>>>>> +IPv6 Security Option).
>>>>> +
>>>>> +To support peer labeling with CIPSO and CALIPSO or fallback labeling,
>>>>> +the NetLabel tools need to be installed:
>>>>> `dnf install netlabel_tools`
>>>>> @@ -52,8 +63,12 @@ OpenSwan but is now distributed as LibreSwan:
>>>>> `dnf install libreswan`
>>>>> It is important to note that the kernel must be configured to
>>>>> support
>>>>> -these services. The Fedora kernels are configured to handle all the above
>>>>> -services.
>>>>> +these services (`CONFIG_NETLABEL`, `CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK`,
>>>>> +`CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK`,
>>>>> +`CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CONNSECMARK`,
>>>>> +`CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_SECMARK`, `CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY`,
>>>>> +`CONFIG_IP6_NF_SECURITY`). At least Fedora and Debian kernels are
>>>>> +configured to handle all the above services.
>>>>> The Linux networking package *iproute* has an SELinux aware
>>>>> socket
>>>>> statistics command ***ss**(8)* that will show the SELinux context of
>>>>> @@ -65,7 +80,7 @@ to achieve this).
>>>>> <br>
>>>>> -## SECMARK
>>>>> +## Internal labeling: SECMARK
>>>>> SECMARK makes use of the standard kernel NetFilter framework
>>>>> that
>>>>> underpins the GNU / Linux IP networking sub-system. NetFilter services
>>>>> @@ -73,7 +88,7 @@ automatically inspects all incoming and outgoing packets and can place
>>>>> controls on interfaces, IP addresses (nodes) and ports with the added
>>>>> advantage of connection tracking. The SECMARK security extensions allow
>>>>> security contexts to be added to packets (SECMARK) or sessions
>>>>> -(CONNSECMARK).
>>>>> +(CONNSECMARK), belonging to object class of `packet`.
>>>>> The NetFilter framework inspects and tag packets with labels as
>>>>> defined
>>>>> within ***iptables**(8)* (also 'nftables' ***nft**(8)* from version 9.3 with
>>>>> @@ -172,6 +187,16 @@ table ip6 security {
>>>>> }
>>>>> ```
>>>>> +Before the SECMARK rules can be loaded, TE rules must be added
>>>>> to
>>>>> +define the types, and also allow domains to send and/or receive
>>>>> +objects of `packet` class:
>>>>> +
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +type test_server_packet_t, packet_type;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +allow my_server_t test_server_packet_t:packet { send recv };
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> The following articles explain the SECMARK service:
>>>>> - [*Transitioning to Secmark*](http://paulmoore.livejournal.com/4281.html)
>>>>> - [New secmark-based network controls for SELinux](http://james-morris.livejournal.com/11010.html)
>>>>> @@ -179,7 +204,7 @@ The following articles explain the SECMARK service:
>>>>> <br>
>>>>> -## NetLabel - Fallback Peer Labeling
>>>>> +## Internal labeling: NetLabel - Fallback Peer Labeling
>>>>> Fallback labeling can optionally be implemented on a system if
>>>>> the
>>>>> Labeled IPSec or CIPSO/CALIPSO is not being used (hence 'fallback
>>>>> @@ -217,9 +242,20 @@ netlabelctl -p map list
>>>>> Note that the security contexts must be valid in the policy otherwise the
>>>>> commands will fail.
>>>>> +Before the NetLabel rules can be loaded, TE rules must be added
>>>>> to
>>>>> +define the types. Then the rules can allow domains to receive data
>>>>> +from objects of `peer` class:
>>>>> +
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +type netlabel_sctp_peer_t;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +allow my_server_t netlabel_sctp_peer_t:peer recv;
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +Note that sending can't be controlled with `peer` class.
>>>>> +
>>>>> <br>
>>>>> -## NetLabel – CIPSO/CALIPSO
>>>>> +## Labeled Networking: NetLabel – CIPSO/CALIPSO
>>>>> To allow MLS [**security levels**](mls_mcs.md#security-levels)
>>>>> to be passed
>>>>> over a network between MLS
>>>>> @@ -288,7 +324,7 @@ section, plus the standard Fedora 'targeted' policy for the tests.
>>>>> <br>
>>>>> -## Labeled IPSec
>>>>> +## Labeled Networking: Labeled IPSec
>>>>> Labeled IPSec has been built into the standard GNU / Linux
>>>>> IPSec
>>>>> services as described in the
>>>>> @@ -451,6 +487,98 @@ The *selinux-testsuite tools/nfs.sh* tests labeled NFS using various labels.
>>>>> <br>
>>>>> +## Access Control for Network Interfaces
>>>>> +
>>>>> +SELinux domains can be restricted to use only specific network
>>>>> +interfaces. TE rules must define the interface types and then allow a
>>>>> +domain to `egress` in class `netif` for the defined interface types:
>>>>> +
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +require {
>>>>> + attribute netif_type;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +type external_if_t, netif_type;
>>>>> +type loopback_if_t, netif_type;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +allow my_server_t external_if_t:netif egress;
>>>>> +allow my_server_t loopback_if_t:netif egress;
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> +The interfaces must also be labeled with ***semanage**(8)* (or by
>>>>> +using `netifcon` statements in the policy):
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +semanage interface -a -t loopback_if_t -r s0 lo
>>>>> +semanage interface -a -t external_if_t -r s0 eth0
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> +Note that reception can't be controlled with `netif` class.
>>>>
>>>> Probably nothing but I did not understand this: Is reception not
>>>> controlled with the netif ingress permission?
>>>
>>> I'm no expert, but the only netif ingress rules which I have are
>>> rather generic:
>>>
>>> allow internet_peer_t external_if_t:netif ingress;
>>> allow link_local_peer_t external_if_t:netif ingress;
>>> allow localnet_peer_t external_if_t:netif ingress;
>>> allow multicast_peer_t external_if_t:netif ingress;
>>> allow loopback_peer_t loopback_if_t:netif ingress;
>>>
>>> `peer` types above have been added with NetLabel rules like:
>>>
>>> netlabelctl unlbl add default address:2000::/3
>>> label:system_u:object_r:internet_peer_t:s0
>>>
>>> Perhaps this would be better:
>>>
>>> Note that reception for application domains can't be controlled with
>>> `netif` class.
>>>
>>
>> I look at it this way: peers *are* processes, You seem to
>> essentually use peers as nodes above.
>
> I think both are true. When labeled IPSec is used, it's probably (I
> haven't tried it yet) possible to identify peers at process
> level. Without IPSec it's only possible to get peer labeling with
> NetLabel rules, which only allow IP address (host or even networks of
> hosts) level accuracy.
>
The thing, i think, is that netlabel is limited and really geared
towards MLS, it will only send levels over the wire i believe (except for loopback)
By AFAIK the point of netlabel is to be able enforce mult-level security
on secure networks. For example you could have a ssh server running on a
particular level. In other words netlabel AFAIK should be able to send a
process/peer level over the network AFAIK.
>> It would become more clear if you would try this out with labeled ipsec.
>> A peer, in my experience is kind of the same as an association in the
>> labeled ipsec scenario (the classes actually overlap). That is also why
>> you should probably disable the netlabel_peer_controls polcap if you use
>> labeled ipsec.
>
> Right, but I think my setup could be useful for cases where labeled
> IPSec is not used.
>
> Do you see AVC denials etc. for netif *ingress* for process level
> domains with labeled IPSec?
I use to have extensive recordings and blogs about this matter but i
erased it all, and i currently dont have a ipsec tunnel, or avc denials,
but I do vaguely recall that the ingress with labeled ipsec was on a per process
level. I might be wrong though.
I would probably just omit the line about the reception to be on the
safe side. (can always add that later if needed)
>
> -Topi
>
>>>>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +<br>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +## Access Control for Network Nodes
>>>>> +
>>>>> +Domains can be restricted by SELinux to access and bind sockets to
>>>>> +only dedicated network nodes (in practice, IP addresses).
>>>>> +
>>>>> +The node types must be defined and then the node types can be used for
>>>>> +TE rules as target context. TE rules to allow a domain to `sendto` for
>>>>> +class `node` and to `node_bind` (for incoming connections) for class
>>>>> +`tcp_socket`:
>>>>> +
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +require {
>>>>> + attribute node_type;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +type loopback_node_t, node_type;
>>>>> +type internet_node_t, node_type;
>>>>> +type link_local_node_t, node_type;
>>>>> +type multicast_node_t, node_type;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +allow my_server_t loopback_node_t:node sendto;
>>>>> +allow my_server_t loopback_node_t:tcp_socket node_bind;
>>>>> +allow my_server_t internet_node_t:node sendto;
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> +After the types have been defined, corresponding node rules can be
>>>>> +added with `semanage` (or `nodecon` statements):
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +semanage node -a -M /128 -p ipv6 -t loopback_node_t -r s0 ::1
>>>>> +semanage node -a -M /3 -p ipv6 -t internet_node_t -r s0 2000::
>>>>> +semanage node -a -M /8 -p ipv6 -t link_local_node_t -r s0 fe00::
>>>>> +semanage node -a -M /8 -p ipv6 -t multicast_node_t -r s0 ff00::
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> +<br>
>>>>> +
>>>>> +## Access Control for Network Ports
>>>>> +
>>>>> +SELinux policy can also control access to ports used by various
>>>>> +networking protocols such as TCP, UDP, SCTP and DCCP. TE rules must
>>>>> +define the port types and then allow a domain to `name_connect`
>>>>> +(outgoing) or `name_bind` (incoming) in class `tcp_socket` (or
>>>>> +`udp_socket` etc) for the defined port types:
>>>>> +
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +require {
>>>>> + attribute port_type;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +type my_server_port_t, port_type;
>>>>> +
>>>>> +allow my_server_t my_server_port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;
>>>>> +allow my_server_t my_server_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> +The ports must also be labeled with `semanage` (or `portcon`
>>>>> +statements):
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +semanage port -a -t my_server_port_t -p tcp -r s0 12345
>>>>> +```
>>>>> +
>>>>> +<br>
>>>>> +
>>>>> <section class="footnotes">
>>>>> <ol>
>>>>> <li id="fnn1"><p>For example, an ftp session where the server is
>>>>> listening on a specific port (the destination port) but the client
>>>>> will be assigned a random source port. The CONNSECMARK will ensure
>>>>> that all packets for the ftp session are marked with the same label.<a
>>>>> href="#fnnet1" class="footnote-back">↩</a></p></li>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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Dominick Grift
