Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
> List all access control methods available for networking and provide
> examples for each.
>
> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> ---
> v2: address comments from Richard Haines
> ---
> src/network_statements.md | 2 +-
> src/network_support.md | 170 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/network_statements.md b/src/network_statements.md
> index ef1c873..357c3b1 100644
> --- a/src/network_statements.md
> +++ b/src/network_statements.md
> @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ the interface to a security context.
> <tr>
> <td><code>packet_context</code></td>
> <td><p>The security context allocated packets. Note that these are defined but unused.</p>
> -<p>The iptables(8)/nftables(8) <a href="network_support.md#secmark">SECMARK services</a> should be used to label packets.</p></td>
> +<p>The iptables(8)/nftables(8) <a
> href="network_support.md#internal-labeling-secmark">SECMARK
> services</a> should be used to label packets.</p></td>
> </tr>
> </tbody>
> </table>
> diff --git a/src/network_support.md b/src/network_support.md
> index 309e863..6f9896b 100644
> --- a/src/network_support.md
> +++ b/src/network_support.md
> @@ -1,20 +1,17 @@
> # SELinux Networking Support
>
> -SELinux supports the following types of network labeling:
> +SELinux supports several methods for access control of networks. These are
>
> -**Internal labeling** - This is where network objects are labeled and
> -managed internally within a single machine (i.e. their labels are not
> -transmitted as part of the session with remote systems). There are two
> -types supported: SECMARK and NetLabel. There was a service known as
> -'compat_net' controls, however that was removed in kernel 2.6.30.
> +* Packet labeling: class `packet`
> +* Peer labeling: class `peer`
> +* Interface control: class `netif`
> +* Network node control: class `node`
> +* TCP/UDP/SCTP/DCCP ports: class `port`
>
> -**Labeled Networking** - This is where labels are passed to/from remote
> -systems where they can be interpreted and a MAC policy enforced on each
> -system. There are three types supported: Labeled IPSec, CIPSO
> -(Commercial IP Security Option) and CALIPSO (Common Architecture Label
> -IPv6 Security Option)
> +Networking support is not enabled by default. It can be enabled either
> +the policy capabilities or by loading SECMARK rules.
>
> -There are two policy capability options that can be set within policy
> +There are three policy capability options that can be set within policy
> using the `policycap` statement that affect networking configuration:
>
> **`network_peer_controls`** - This is always enabled in the latest
> @@ -37,8 +34,22 @@ The policy capability settings are available in userspace via the
> SELinux filesystem as shown in the
> [**SELinux Filesystem**](lsm_selinux.md#selinux-filesystem) section.
>
> -To support peer labeling, CIPSO and CALIPSO the NetLabel tools need to
> -be installed:
> +SELinux supports the following types of network labeling:
> +
> +**Internal labeling** - This is where network objects are labeled and
> +managed internally within a single machine (i.e. their labels are not
> +transmitted as part of the session with remote systems). There are two
> +types supported: SECMARK and NetLabel. There was a service known as
> +'compat_net' controls, however that was removed in kernel 2.6.30.
> +
> +**Labeled Networking** - This is where labels are passed to/from remote
> +systems where they can be interpreted and a MAC policy enforced on each
> +system. There are three types supported: Labeled IPSec, CIPSO
> +(Commercial IP Security Option) and CALIPSO (Common Architecture Label
> +IPv6 Security Option).
> +
> +To support peer labeling with CIPSO and CALIPSO or fallback labeling,
> +the NetLabel tools need to be installed:
>
> `dnf install netlabel_tools`
>
> @@ -52,8 +63,12 @@ OpenSwan but is now distributed as LibreSwan:
> `dnf install libreswan`
>
> It is important to note that the kernel must be configured to support
> -these services. The Fedora kernels are configured to handle all the above
> -services.
> +these services (`CONFIG_NETLABEL`, `CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK`,
> +`CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK`,
> +`CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CONNSECMARK`,
> +`CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_SECMARK`, `CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY`,
> +`CONFIG_IP6_NF_SECURITY`). At least Fedora and Debian kernels are
> +configured to handle all the above services.
>
> The Linux networking package *iproute* has an SELinux aware socket
> statistics command ***ss**(8)* that will show the SELinux context of
> @@ -65,7 +80,7 @@ to achieve this).
>
> <br>
>
> -## SECMARK
> +## Internal labeling: SECMARK
>
> SECMARK makes use of the standard kernel NetFilter framework that
> underpins the GNU / Linux IP networking sub-system. NetFilter services
> @@ -73,7 +88,7 @@ automatically inspects all incoming and outgoing packets and can place
> controls on interfaces, IP addresses (nodes) and ports with the added
> advantage of connection tracking. The SECMARK security extensions allow
> security contexts to be added to packets (SECMARK) or sessions
> -(CONNSECMARK).
> +(CONNSECMARK), belonging to object class of `packet`.
>
> The NetFilter framework inspects and tag packets with labels as defined
> within ***iptables**(8)* (also 'nftables' ***nft**(8)* from version 9.3 with
> @@ -172,6 +187,16 @@ table ip6 security {
> }
> ```
>
> +Before the SECMARK rules can be loaded, TE rules must be added to
> +define the types, and also allow domains to send and/or receive
> +objects of `packet` class:
> +
> +```
> +type test_server_packet_t, packet_type;
> +
> +allow my_server_t test_server_packet_t:packet { send recv };
> +```
> +
> The following articles explain the SECMARK service:
> - [*Transitioning to Secmark*](http://paulmoore.livejournal.com/4281.html)
> - [New secmark-based network controls for SELinux](http://james-morris.livejournal.com/11010.html)
> @@ -179,7 +204,7 @@ The following articles explain the SECMARK service:
>
> <br>
>
> -## NetLabel - Fallback Peer Labeling
> +## Internal labeling: NetLabel - Fallback Peer Labeling
>
> Fallback labeling can optionally be implemented on a system if the
> Labeled IPSec or CIPSO/CALIPSO is not being used (hence 'fallback
> @@ -217,9 +242,20 @@ netlabelctl -p map list
> Note that the security contexts must be valid in the policy otherwise the
> commands will fail.
>
> +Before the NetLabel rules can be loaded, TE rules must be added to
> +define the types. Then the rules can allow domains to receive data
> +from objects of `peer` class:
> +
> +```
> +type netlabel_sctp_peer_t;
> +
> +allow my_server_t netlabel_sctp_peer_t:peer recv;
> +```
> +Note that sending can't be controlled with `peer` class.
> +
> <br>
>
> -## NetLabel – CIPSO/CALIPSO
> +## Labeled Networking: NetLabel – CIPSO/CALIPSO
>
> To allow MLS [**security levels**](mls_mcs.md#security-levels) to be passed
> over a network between MLS
> @@ -288,7 +324,7 @@ section, plus the standard Fedora 'targeted' policy for the tests.
>
> <br>
>
> -## Labeled IPSec
> +## Labeled Networking: Labeled IPSec
>
> Labeled IPSec has been built into the standard GNU / Linux IPSec
> services as described in the
> @@ -451,6 +487,98 @@ The *selinux-testsuite tools/nfs.sh* tests labeled NFS using various labels.
>
> <br>
>
> +## Access Control for Network Interfaces
> +
> +SELinux domains can be restricted to use only specific network
> +interfaces. TE rules must define the interface types and then allow a
> +domain to `egress` in class `netif` for the defined interface types:
> +
> +```
> +require {
> + attribute netif_type;
> +}
> +
> +type external_if_t, netif_type;
> +type loopback_if_t, netif_type;
> +
> +allow my_server_t external_if_t:netif egress;
> +allow my_server_t loopback_if_t:netif egress;
> +```
> +
> +The interfaces must also be labeled with ***semanage**(8)* (or by
> +using `netifcon` statements in the policy):
> +```
> +semanage interface -a -t loopback_if_t -r s0 lo
> +semanage interface -a -t external_if_t -r s0 eth0
> +```
> +
> +Note that reception can't be controlled with `netif` class.
Probably nothing but I did not understand this: Is reception not
controlled with the netif ingress permission?
> +
> +<br>
> +
> +## Access Control for Network Nodes
> +
> +Domains can be restricted by SELinux to access and bind sockets to
> +only dedicated network nodes (in practice, IP addresses).
> +
> +The node types must be defined and then the node types can be used for
> +TE rules as target context. TE rules to allow a domain to `sendto` for
> +class `node` and to `node_bind` (for incoming connections) for class
> +`tcp_socket`:
> +
> +```
> +require {
> + attribute node_type;
> +}
> +
> +type loopback_node_t, node_type;
> +type internet_node_t, node_type;
> +type link_local_node_t, node_type;
> +type multicast_node_t, node_type;
> +
> +allow my_server_t loopback_node_t:node sendto;
> +allow my_server_t loopback_node_t:tcp_socket node_bind;
> +allow my_server_t internet_node_t:node sendto;
> +```
> +
> +After the types have been defined, corresponding node rules can be
> +added with `semanage` (or `nodecon` statements):
> +```
> +semanage node -a -M /128 -p ipv6 -t loopback_node_t -r s0 ::1
> +semanage node -a -M /3 -p ipv6 -t internet_node_t -r s0 2000::
> +semanage node -a -M /8 -p ipv6 -t link_local_node_t -r s0 fe00::
> +semanage node -a -M /8 -p ipv6 -t multicast_node_t -r s0 ff00::
> +```
> +
> +<br>
> +
> +## Access Control for Network Ports
> +
> +SELinux policy can also control access to ports used by various
> +networking protocols such as TCP, UDP, SCTP and DCCP. TE rules must
> +define the port types and then allow a domain to `name_connect`
> +(outgoing) or `name_bind` (incoming) in class `tcp_socket` (or
> +`udp_socket` etc) for the defined port types:
> +
> +```
> +require {
> + attribute port_type;
> +}
> +
> +type my_server_port_t, port_type;
> +
> +allow my_server_t my_server_port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;
> +allow my_server_t my_server_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
> +```
> +
> +The ports must also be labeled with `semanage` (or `portcon`
> +statements):
> +```
> +semanage port -a -t my_server_port_t -p tcp -r s0 12345
> +```
> +
> +<br>
> +
> <section class="footnotes">
> <ol>
> <li id="fnn1"><p>For example, an ftp session where the server is
> listening on a specific port (the destination port) but the client
> will be assigned a random source port. The CONNSECMARK will ensure
> that all packets for the ftp session are marked with the same label.<a
> href="#fnnet1" class="footnote-back">↩</a></p></li>
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