On 2/8/2019 2:52 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote: > On 2019/02/08 1:24, Casey Schaufler wrote: >>>>> Then, I think that it is straightforward (and easier to manage) to ignore security= parameter >>>>> when lsm= parameter is specified. >>>> That reduces flexibility somewhat. If I am debugging security modules >>>> I may want to use lsm= to specify the order while using security= to >>>> identify a specific exclusive module. I could do that using lsm= by >>>> itself, but habits die hard. >>> "lsm=" can be used for identifying a specific exclusive module, and Ubuntu kernels would >>> have to use CONFIG_LSM (or "lsm=") for identifying the default exclusive module (in order >>> to allow enabling both TOMOYO and one of SELinux,Smack,AppArmor at the same time). >>> >>> Since "security=" can't be used for selectively enable/disable more than one of >>> SELinux,Smack,TOMOYO,AppArmor, I think that recommending users to migrate to "lsm=" is the >>> better direction. And ignoring "security=" when "lsm=" is specified is easier to understand. >> I added Kees to the CC list. Kees, what to you think about >> ignoring security= if lsm= is specified? I'm ambivalent. >> >> > To help administrators easily understand what LSM modules are possibly enabled by default (which > have to be fetched from e.g. /boot/config-`uname -r`) $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm > and specify lsm= parameter when they need, > I propose changes shown below. > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 3147785e..051d708 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ > static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; > static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; > > -static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; > - > /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ > static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; > static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; > @@ -284,14 +282,22 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) > static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) > { > struct lsm_info **lsm; > + const char *order = CONFIG_LSM; > + const char *origin = "builtin"; > > ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), > GFP_KERNEL); > > - if (chosen_lsm_order) > - ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); > - else > - ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); > + if (chosen_lsm_order) { > + if (chosen_major_lsm) { > + pr_info("security= is ignored because of lsm=\n"); > + chosen_major_lsm = NULL; > + } > + order = chosen_lsm_order; > + origin = "cmdline"; > + } > + pr_info("Security Framework initializing: %s\n", order); > + ordered_lsm_parse(order, origin); > > for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) > prepare_lsm(*lsm); > @@ -333,8 +339,6 @@ int __init security_init(void) > int i; > struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads; > > - pr_info("Security Framework initializing\n"); > - > for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head); > i++) > INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]); I'm not going to object to this, but I don't see it as important.