On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 01:06:54PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > If the same block device is visible, with rw access, in two different > containers, I don't see any anything good can happen. It's worse than that. I've fixed a lot of bugs which cause the kernel to crash, and a few that might be levered into a privilege escalationh attack, when you mount a maliciously corrupted file system using ext4. I'm told told the security researcher filed similar reports with the XFS community, and he was told, "that's what metadata checksums are for; go away". Given how much time it takes to work with these security researchers, I don't blame them. But in light of that, I'd make a somewhat stronger statement. If you let an untrusted container mount arbitrary block devices where they have rw acccess to the underlying block device, nothing good can happen. Period. :-) Which is why I don't think the lack of being able to reject "conflicting mount options" is really all that important. It certainly shouldn't block the fsopen patch series. #1, it's a problem we have today, and #2, I'm really not all sure supporting bind mounts via specifying block device was ever a good idea to begin with. And #3, while I've been fixing ext4 against security issues caused by maliciously corrupted file system images, I'm still sure that allowing untrusted containers access to mount *any* file system via a block device for which they have r/w access is a Really Bad Idea. > It seems to me that the current approach mostly involves crossing our fingers. Agreed! - Ted _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxx. To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
